The Globalization and Financialization of Montreal Water:

Network Procurement Practices for Commodifying a Commons by Worton, Maria
   
 
The Globalization and Financialization of Montreal Water: 
















Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts (Sociology) at 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
 
August 2016 
 Maria Worton 2016 
 
   
 
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared  
By:                 _________________________________________________________ 
Entitled:          
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
                          
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
                         Chair 
                        Professor Vered Amit 
                        __________________________________________ Examiner 
                        Professor Beverly Best 
                        __________________________________________ Examiner 
                        Professor Satoshi Ikeda 
                        __________________________________________ Supervisor 
                        Professor Katja Neves 
 
Approved by   _____________________________________________________ 
                        Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director 
                        _____________________________________________________ 
                        Dean of Faculty 
 
Date                   __________________________________________________________






The Globalization and Financialization of Montreal Water: 




The City of Montreal describes its water as a public service. This thesis complicates if not 
challenges such a designation by showing how emergent water-related infrastructure 
procurement practices are introducing global and financial markets into Montreal water. Indeed, 
Montreal’s Green Economy is arguably valuing all water-related infrastructure with the intention 
of commodifying it fully. While such commodification is diluting Montreal’s Water Commons 
with private actors and private decision-making, away from democratic procedures. The 
following actor network analysis shows multiple and heterogenous actors, relations and 
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The Globalization and Financialization of Montreal Water: 
Network Procurement Practices for Commodifying a Commons 
  
     This thesis shows how an emergent network for procurement is extending global and financial 
markets for water-related goods, services and infrastructure into Montreal water. This emergent 
network is not a subject of public and academic discourse at this time. This is true even though 
its purpose of globalizing and financializing Montreal’s water-related procurement is shown to 
be at odds with practices that have historically been associated with water as a public service in 
Montreal: local municipal provision and control of drinking water and a universal access not 
contingent upon ability to pay. Such practices are denoted, in what follows, by the term ‘the 
Commons’ or Vindana Shiva’s ‘water democracy’ (Shiva 2005, 137-139; Harvey 2011).   
     Since the 70’s, much research has documented the trend turning public water into private 
delivery and financial assets for the markets, facilitated by the insinuation of private decision 
makers and commercially-oriented policy prescriptions (Swyngendouw 2005; Bakker 2007; 
Bakker and Furlong 2010b; Bayliss 2014, Bresnihan 2015). Such water privatization processes 
have also been observed and documented in Quebec and Montreal (Hamel 2008; Audette-
Chapdelaine 2009). This thesis builds on this scholarly tradition by showing the emergent 
globalization and financialization of not only Montreal water but all of its water-related 
infrastructure via procurement practices, increasing private influence and private decision 
making therein. Specifically, the contribution of this thesis is to analyze ways in which new and 
emergent procurement practices and their relations are formatting all Montreal water-related 
infrastructure into global and financial markets and away from local democratic procedures. 
      It’s likely fair to say that most Montrealers have assumed their Water Services to be a 
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singularly public infrastructure, if for no other reason than it’s managed by the City. The City 
itself describes its Water Services as “une organisation publique de l’eau performante et 
reconnue comme telle par la population” (Ville de Montreal, Gestion de l’eau). This monolithic 
vision of Montreal Water Services is troubled with the adoption by this thesis of a network 
approach called Actor Network Theory (ANT) to the City’s water-related procurement. For ANT, 
a network is a thing that can be traced and described in terms of its multiple actors or practices 
and their web of associations and relations.  These associations and relations distribute power 
that is characterized by a particular purpose (teleology) and particular direction (trajectory) 
(Latour 2013, 33).  Indeed, the intention of this network analysis is to complicate Montreal Water 
Services by presenting its multiple actors and their relations that are performing (or enacting) 
Montreal water-related procurement with a view to facilitating the extension of private property 
rights and the power of private global and financial actors into all water-related infrastructure in 
the City. This infrastructure includes Montreal’s Water Services and this thesis therefore 
constitutes a challenge to the designation of these Services as “publique”. 
     Common practices in municipal procurement include the determination of standards, the 
development of specifications, and the analysis of values, in addition to financing, 
price negotiation and tendering for goods and services (Caliskan and Callon 2010b). This thesis 
shows how, in Montreal, such procurement processes are transforming in order to tie Montreal 
water production to global, financial markets via the introduction of practices that capture, value, 
standardize and finance all water-related infrastructure using a new water pricing calculation, 
economies of scale (larger contracts for lower cost), globalized compulsory competitive 
tendering rules (GCCT via prospective trade agreements) and high private debt leveraging 
(loans). 
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     Three of these practices, their relations and effects (or anticipated effects in the case of 
globalized competitive tendering) have been described in literature seen further along, however 
little has been documented with regard to the relations and effects of the new water pricing 
calculation in local contexts. This thesis addresses this lacuna by contributing a description of the 
agency and relations of all four practices working in concert locally within the network for the 
commodification of Montreal’s water-related infrastructure. As such, this thesis details 
commodifying processes via these network practices, their agencies and relations turning 
activities formerly of local use value into assets that can be traded (exchanged) on global 
financial markets (Marx 1887, 506-543; Harvey 2003, 74-75; Huws 2011, 65). 
     This thesis also makes the case for how this network for water-related commodification also 
materializes practices transferring power and influence away from local elected councillors, 
service providers, water users and socio-environmental conditions, towards the likes of unelected 
decision-makers in the form of shareholders, bond investors, markets and transnationals (TNCs) 
in what constitutes a Neoliberal orientation (Huws 2011; Bayliss 2014; Bresnihan 2015; Allen 
and Pryke 2013). Therefore this thesis contributes a local example of how materializing 
procurement practices to commodify water-related infrastructure within global and financial 
markets works hand in glove with detaching water from local democratic procedures, making the 
possibility of dedicated local, civic representation and participation within water policy more 
remote. 
     This thesis argues for how the form of ANT adopted in this thesis is an effective method for 
showing such materializing practices and their relations. ANT recognizes how practices can be 
embedded with texts in the form of scripts, symbols or images and that such texts can be 
empirically analyzed for their functions and effects within their networks (Law 2009). 
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Importantly, ANT also understands that texts are products of power relations that perform 
relations and “tell particular stories about particular relations” (Law 2009, 142). Texts performed 
by the network for the globalization and financialization of water-related procurement include 
municipal minutes, trade accords, financial regulations, a new pricing calculation for costing 
water, meter readings and so on. 
     That these emergent procurement practices and their texts have barely been formally 
discussed, debated, and deliberated upon with Montrealers is understood here as one effect of the 
network and its power.  Of concern to this thesis are the effects of the Network that are being 
externalized or absented from the political and public landscapes of the City by the Network 
itself.  This thesis shares the following sentiment, that, “We should seek to describe multiple 
conditions of decision-making or imbalance remembering C. Wright Mills’ insight that absences 
are just as important as presences in giving capitalism impetus and direction” (Mills 1956; 
Bowman and Erturk 2012, 24;). This concern with absence and presence speaks to the political 
matter of how and the roles of representation, framing, mediation, power, as well as decision-
making, in bringing Neoliberal water realities and their conditions to bear here in Montreal. 
     This thesis describes an emergent network of practices, emergent in that the network is still 
materializing, which is to say that practices could still meet with sufficient resistance to frustrate 
and even fail the network. Ursula Huws (2011), academic and public services advocate, has 
stressed the need to read practices and their relations as they are being introduced because of 
their tendency to signify early warning signs of commodification processes transforming what is 
public and commonly available to all into what is private, and exclusive, even under public 
management (65). With these concerns in mind, the following questions motivate this account: 
How are the new procurement practices and their network relations being realized? What 
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realities are being presented, absented or externalized via the emerging network?  What  
materializes with the emergence of the network? And how are resistances to the network 
materializing? 
How ANT Can Describe the Network 
     Government procurement refers to the outsourcing of production to private contractors 
delivering goods and services, paid for by public money.  Government procurement represents 
approximately 15-20% of GDP in OECD countries and considerable strategic, developmental 
power to stimulate local economy and also transfer public wealth to the private sector (Thai and 
Grimm 2000, 231; Joint EU-Canada Scoping Exercise March 5 2009, 7; Shrybman 2010). 
     To contract out for public goods and services requires their translation into contracts which in 
turn require the determination of standards, the development of specifications, and the analysis 
of values, in addition to the financing, price negotiation and tendering for goods and services in 
the procurement marketplace (Caliskan and Callon 2010b). These are key practices within 
procurement networks. 
     Public procurement processes are however political, economic, financial, environmental and 
social and they are presently financializing and globalizing in many countries, as seen in Chapter 
Two, and yet they rarely become a matter for public debate and deliberation. The procurement of 
water-related infrastructure is barely open to public debate, a reality that likely relates to how the 
greater marketization and private delivery of the goods, services and infrastructure that comprise 
public water has quietly ensued under the radar of most Montrealers. How is this so? And how 
can procurement practices materialize within networks? This chapter describes the theoretical 
underpinnings of ANT that informs the ANT methodology used and its application within this 
thesis. 
 6 
STS, ANT, Practices and Reality 
     Actor Network Theory (ANT) emerged from Science and Technology Studies (STS) that 
explores how science and technology are shaped by and in turn reproduce social, cultural, 
institutional and economic forms through practices (Law 2009, 143). ANT agrees with STS that 
theory has to be put into practice, as noted above, for realities to materialize.  STS takes a broad 
view of what constitutes practices (scientific and otherwise), “knowledges, social relations, 
cultural assumptions, textual traces, embodiments, subjectivities, elements of the material world 
[…] tools and larger contexts or chains of infrastructural relations” (Law and Williams 2014, 21-
25).  This thesis shows how many such practices are being materialized as a globalized and 
financialized procurement that provides Montreal with the goods and services that comprise 
water-related infrastructure. 
     STS ANT understands, through the work of Thomas Kuhn, that knowledge production can 
only be transferred through practices in their function as problem-solving paradigms or examples 
(Law 2009, 143-144). For instance, the solution to the costly problem of Montreal’s aging water 
infrastructure and leaky pipes is for water production to be valued as assets for the financial 
markets (Service de l’eau: annexe 2011, 39).   
     With extension, paradigms produce problem solving cultures (Law 2009, 143).  Market-
oriented problem-solving models have been reproduced over and again to create financialized 
problem-solving culture. Such models have turned up in Montreal water procurement strategies 
as part of the City’s emergent Green Economic paradigm, as described in Chapter Three. How 
can this happen? 
     Montreal did not come up with this financializing culture out of the blue. Other powerful 
realities, and their problem solving cultures have contributed to its materialization. Law (2004) 
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has designated these realities hinterlands (34).  Following Latour and Woolgar’s STS seminal 
study “Laboratory Life”, Law (2004) uses the term hinterland to refer to those pre-existing social 
and material realities that offer something of a template for what can be said and thought of as 
real (34). Neoliberalism is one such hinterland, denoting the economic trend from the 80’s 
onward that has been materializing the ongoing transfer of economic control from the public 
sector to the private with the insinuation of private-interests into government (Gamble 2007; 
Brennan 2012, 3-4).  These Neoliberal interests have lobbied for market-based solutions via the 
insinuation of corporate decision-making and corporate production of public utilies and its 
infrastructure, as described in Chapter Two (Swyngendouw 2005; Bakker 2007; Bakker and 
Furlong 2010b; Bayliss 2014, Bresnihan 2015). 
      Law (2004) elaborates that it is owing to hinterlands that, “Some classes of possibilities are 
made thinkable and real. Some are made less thinkable and less real. And yet others are rendered 
completely unthinkable and completely unreal” (34). Neoliberalism has involved two other 
hinterlands that of globalization and financialization that in concert have materialized in 
Montreal the local Network producing (among others) four new water procurement devices: 
globalized  compulsory competitive tendering (GCCT), larger contracts for economies of scale, a 
new pricing calculation for water, and high private debt leveraging (financial loans), analyzed in 
Chapters Two and Three. But the question arises as to how the practices that produce realities are 
enacted and how they can materialize problem solving cultures that influence the materialization 
of realities elsewhere. 
     The ANT version of STS provides case studies showing how practices are enacted within 
network formations (Law 2009).  As indicated above, it holds that a network is a thing that 
requires multiple practices) from different domains that relate together within a web formation 
 8 
that has purpose and trajectory (Latour 2013, 33). To show what this means, ANT adopts the 
concepts of multiplicity and relationality to describe both the materialization and extension of 
realities, into different realities, such as that seen in Montreal. 
ANT, Material Semiotics Materializing Networks 
     The theory in ANT describes its methodology i.e. how a reality can be analyzed as a network 
of actors (or practices). ANT is done by describing and analyzing how different and multiple 
kinds of actors/practices, human, non-human and non-living, define and shape one another 
through their relationality.  Law dubs the this meaning-making and relationality between things 
and concepts material semiotics (Law 2009, 146). 
     According to Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic theory, an object is given meaning when it acquires 
a sign; and any given object can have many signs (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
2010). The larger the network the more signs it has, hence the notion of multiplicity. For 
instance, the object of water-related infrastructure procurement has legal signs, economic signs, 
financial signs, environmental, conservation signs and so on. The various signs signifying the 
object originate in intrinsically different domains, are heterogenous, yet can still signify or define 
the same object (Latour 2013, 296; Law and Williams 2014, 21-25). 
     This thesis describes relations of a fairly large scale and heterogenous actor network, when 
ANT more commonly concerns itself with networks of a smaller scale. However there are larger 
scale actor network case studies too.  For instance, Law and Williams (2014) have recently 
provided one example that combines ANT with political economy to analyze and address the 
problem of financialization of public service provision in the UK (20).  And as early as 1986, 
Law’s seminal study of how the Portuguese mercantile, imperial project reached India in 1498 
described the expansion of a network that allowed them to control half the world for 150 years 
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(Law 2009, 146). 
     Law (1986) demonstrates in the instance of Portuguese imperialism that “it is not possible to 
understand this expansion [of power] unless the technological, the economic, the political, the 
social, and the natural are all seen as being interrelated” (235).  This thesis is motivated by a 
similar view that holds that the emergent expansion of financial and global market power into 
Montreal water-related procurement cannot be understood without an analysis that interrelates 
heterogeneous actors/practices from multiple domains. And it takes in the roles played by 
technology, economics, finance and environmentalism to describe the Neoliberal relations of an 
emerging network for water-related procurement in Montreal. 
     Though signs of the object can be multiple and heterogenous, the question remains as to the 
processes via which heterogenous signs become practices (actors) relating within a web 
formation. This transformation is largely the work of translation, a concept that originates, once 
again, in the semiotics of Peirce, who found that the relationship between the object and its signs 
cannot just be two-fold in character i.e. sign and object; but that for the sign to actually 
communicate its meaning, it must be triadic (have three parts): the object, the sign and its 
translation (or interpretant). The interpretant (i.e. the translation) is an understanding of the sign 
of the object (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil osophy 2010; Atkin 2008, 65-66).
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     Callon (1998) explains this triangular relationship within a sign to be “the elementary unit of 
the Network” whereby without C (or translation) A and B, object and sign, can only be 
understood as being embedded in ambient and often invisible relations impacting them; to 
understand these relations it is necessary to introduce a third actor, C and “to adopt its point of 
view, for the relationship between A and B to become analysable and comprehensible” (9). 1 
     As an illustration, in Montreal there is water-related procurement (A) and a sign of this 
procurement is a new water pricing calculation (B) which is translated by Green Economy 
prescriptions as a market method for giving all water-related infrastructure a ‘true’ or market 
value, (C). As shown in Chapter Two, this is not the only translation; there are other counter 
translations translating this sign too, as seen in Chapter Two. 
     STS and ANT understands that signs are translated by and into webs of practices thanks to the 
translation that enables them to communicate with the other practices in the web or network. As 
noted above, STS and ANT takes a very broad view of what a practice can be and that these 
possibilities include textual traces in the form of scripts, symbols and images (May and Powell 
2008, 146).  The version of ANT adopted in this thesis is a material semiotics that proceeds by 
tracing and reading these textual forms that constitute what are the communications or relations 
of the Network being described for the reality it is materializing in Montreal. 
     May and Powell (2008) invoke Callon (1991, 140) when they describe texts as intermediaries 
that allow the practices (actors) of the network to communicate their values with one another, 
constituting what is social about the network (146). This communication is key to composing the 
network itself when, “The activity of inscriptions materializes in the prescriptions of a given 
                                                 
1 Decoded Science, http://www.decodedscience.org/charles-sanders-peirces-semiotics-the-
triadic-model/22974 
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object” (May and Powell 2008, 146). Prescriptions, in the semiotic sense of the concept, perform 
as values. They actively define (translate) the network of practices by distributing power in the 
form of these values among the actors. Examples of intermediaries in this thesis are policy 
prescriptions, water commodities, water meter readings, money and standards. 
     ANT’s material semiotics then proceeds on the understanding then that ‘the social’ is not a 
discrete realm, apart from nature or culture, but rather describes the relations or intermediaries 
connecting multiple and heterogenous actors and so forming various patterns, assemblages or 
networks in various material forms (Latour 2013, 296; Law and Williams 2014, 21-25). As an 
exemplar, Law (1987) describes how Portuguese imperialism was able to control half the world 
through the generation of a network. Using a material semiotics he found that multiple actors 
such as ships, sailors, guns, astrolabes, currents, maps, gifts and so on, were all translated into a 
web. And that “that web, precarious as it was, gave each component a particular shape or form 
that was to hold together for 150 years” (Law 2009, 146). Together these actors performed 
pathways to resources, products, markets, merchants and performative populations. 
     Law (1987) descrips the Portuguese ships as immutable mobiles deploying Latour’s concept 
in order to underline the performance of more powerful intermediaries, with the mobility, 
durability and capacity to apply force, whilst holding their form; in short, immutable mobiles are 
how large networks grow, and extend their power and influence (Latour 1987, 227; Law 2009, 
146). In Montreal, as elsewhere, Green Economy (or market environmentalism) performs as an 
immutable mobile, circulating market-based or monetizing values  that translate water 
conservation as water production’s full marketization with the claim that raising the market value 
of water-related infrastructure and production will reduce its demand. This formula is being used 
to translate labour, water-pricing calculations, water meters, pipes, aqueducts and so on, into 
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Montreal’s Network for globalized and financialized procurement, as described in the Chapters 
that follow. 
     The concept of standards, as intermediaries imparting values, is also important to this thesis, 
not only in terms of the corporate standards shaping municipal water infrastructure procurement, 
but also because as Latour (2005) notes “most coordination among agents is achieved through 
the dissemination of quasi-standards” (229).  And these might include best practices, water 
policies and strategies and their embedded values in the form of market-oriented prescriptions, as 
seen in Chapter Three. 
      Law (2009) stresses how the activity and variability of the network cannot be 
underestimated.  He uses the concept of assembling to more fully suggest the mediating work 
that “a web of relations [a network]” does as “it makes and remakes its components [that] are 
being domesticated in a process of translation that relates, defines, and orders objects, human and 
otherwise” (Law 2009, 5).  Relatedly, McFarlane (2009) notes that in contrast to Foucauldian 
notions like apparatus, or governmental technology, the concept of assemblage or assembling 
also captures what is emerging and what is changing, as well as what is already formed.  For 
McFarlane (2009), the concept also points to the provisional nature of assembling. This, he 
argues, contrasts the notion of an evenly distributed power or a single central power (564-565). 
     For the globalizing and financializing of Montreal water the signs that need to translate into 
the network are necessarily multiple and heterogenous. This thesis focusses on the most visible 
of these i.e. economies of scale, a new pricing calculation, financial loans and trade accords. 
Showing this emergent network reality requires also showing the relations that interconnect the 
practices in a purpose and direction (teleology and trajectory). To show the latter also involves 
showing the other realties (hinterlands) and powerful immutable mobiles that make the 
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Network’s values and problem solving prescriptions possible. It involves showing how all of 
these practices and values translate, define and shape each other. Procurement involves markets 
so the following describes both the role of network mediation and performance in the markets. 
ANT, Unremarkable Mediations and Market Performances 
     Montreal, like all cities, can be understood as a hub of networks of power. Callon and Latour 
(1997) describe how networks work or mediate to deploy and extend the property rights upon 
which market economy is predicated and that this requires “an ongoing effort to formalize, 
interconnect, aggregate and coordinate scattered, local markets” (2). The intention in this thesis 
is to show how new water-related procurement devices in Montreal are part of a network both 
deploying private property rights and formalizing the extension of global and financial water-
related procurement markets into the City. 
     Callon and Latour (1997) describe the subtle, unremarkable ways capitalism’s network 
assemblages and power flows materialize relations and absorb ever more deeply new layers of 
what is social (2). The rise of marketized water is one effect of such phenomena, whereby water-
related infrastructure, constituting local water production and delivery, are subject to often 
unremarkable commodification processes. Even though, as Swyndegouw (2005) observes “to the 
extent that water is turned into money and capital, and water users into water customers who pay 
for water the choreographies of political power around water are fundamentally overhauled” 
(91). While some of the work of this thesis is to describe networked choreographies of political 
power shaping Montreal water-related procurement, an ANT analysis also understands the 
crucial role played by less remarkable relations in the everyday, such as transactions and 
exchanges, necessary to the creation of value. 
     Latour and Callon (1997) use the term formatting to underline the activity and agency of these 
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relations and translations resulting in market practices reproducing dominant situations that are 
represented as reality. Formatting, for the authors, denotes “a threefold effort that is 
simultaneously carried out at the level of representations, of institutions, and of the agents’ 
economic calculations” (3). The term formatting understands these economic realities to be 
performative which conceptually understands how they materialize their own identity and 
reproduction via practices that network their associations and relations and contribute to their 
visible reality (Latour and Callon 1997, 3). The concept of formatting is important because it 
understands how a plethora of unremarkable market activities normalize economics which in 
turn nurtures the belief that economics “hides a more complex social reality” (Latour and Callon 
1997, 3), or a greater truth that we take for granted to be there. This may partly speak to why so 
much financial regulation, best practice and economic orientation materializing procurement 
goes unquestioned, as seen in Chapters Three and Four. 
     For Callon, economy cannot be understood without factoring in the economics required in the 
form of those formatting agencies that allow transactions to occur, e.g. marketing, accounting, 
calculations, technologies, policy and regulations, and all their knowledge practices (Callon 
1998, 30). By way of example there is Montreal’s new water pricing calculation that, at first 
glance, may seem a rather unremarkable sign of commodification, and yet its translation into the 
Network is shown in Chapters Two and Three to be crucial to formatting Montreal’s procurement 
of water-related infrastructure within global, financial markets, with many prospective local 
effects. 
     The concept of calculation is important to networks and Michel Callon (1998) has 
demonstrated that “networks can be likened to calculative formulas that contribute to translating 
systems of social relations into monetary values” (Caliskan and Callon 2010b, 19).  Montreal’s 
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new procurement network and its practices can also be seen as one such calculative formula, 
when practices within the new procurement (globalized compulsory competitive tendering, larger 
contracts for economies of scale, high debt leveraging, and a new water pricing calculation) are 
to work together to calculate new market-oriented values for Montreal water-related 
infrastructure.   
     Callon and Munsiesa (2005) employ the term device to capture more of the performative, 
agentic behavior of networks.  John Law and Victoria Singleton (2013) signify ‘a device’ “as a 
set of implicit and explicit strategies that work more or less repetitively to order, sort, define and 
arrange a heterogeneous [network]” (260).  More specifically, the term “collective devices” is 
deployed to describe the interaction of practices (or transactions) between agents that allow 
“compromise to be reached, not only on the nature of the goods [or services] to produce and 
distribute but also on the value to be given them” (1229). 
     In fact, Caliskan and Callon, following Maurer (2006) use the term valorimeter to 
categorize “the various tools, procedures, machines, instruments or, more generally, devices” 
factoring into the translation of values into amounts of money (17). This orientation conceptually 
can convey the agency of Montreal’s emergent water-related procurement practices and relations 
as a heterogeneous network of valorization that includes the new water calculation, economies of 
scale, globalized compulsory competitive tendering (GCCT), and debt leveraging, in addition to 
meters, tariffs, water users, conservation prescriptions, among others, that are all shaping and 
defining one another.   
     ANT also understands that networks materialize externalities as phenomena that subsequently 
go uncalculated, as non-valorized effects of the network. Derived from economic theory, 
externalities are conceived as those effects not taken into account at the point of economic 
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transactions, that are left out of the framing, as it were, and that occur very often at the point of 
social and environmental relations. In this way ANT distinguishes calculated from uncalculated 
relations (15). For Callon (1998) “Framing demarcates, in regard to the network of relationships, 
those which are taken into account and those which are ignored.” ANT understands that how 
actors decide what falls within a framing has also to do with the privilege and power of the 
framing network. 
     Bowman et al (2012) rework and update Mills’ analysis of the ‘military industrial complex’ to 
dub the power imbalance they observe today as the marketization “point value complex” that 
turns on the performance of financial calculations that are less about a stream of value created 
over time via investment in labour and equipment and more about value realized at a point (2); 
‘point’ referring to the value or price change in various tradeable assets. 2 
     Within ANT, phenomena such as financialization, wealth concentration, racism, water 
scarcity, are all understood as effects of power, rather than foundational explanations (Law 2006, 
8). Power itself is understood “as an effect of network configuration and in particular the creation 
of immutable mobiles” as noted above (Law 2009, 146). It stands to reason then that since 
Networks make themselves they too are effects of networks. It follows that Neoliberalism can be 
described as a network of networks. Network effects also materialize resistance in the form of 
counter scripts and their translation in alternative practices. From practices come other practices 
(Law 2009, 152). The Green Economy market translation is presently the dominant problem 
solving culture for valuing water infrastructure, but there are resistances, with counter values 
                                                 
2 
“Points”, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/points.asp) 
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translating an emergent web of counter practices, as seen in Chapter Two. 
     This thesis also draws upon financialization literature and its description of common practices 
geared to promoting and extending the influence of the financial markets throughout the 
economy, including the non-financial sector including public services and utilities (Bowman et al 
2012, 6; Hudson 2012; Lapavitsas 2013). Other authors have demonstrated how the reach of 
financial practices extends to Water Services when they are primarily valued monetarily and then 
transformed into contracts and financial instruments (assets) that can be traded on capital 
markets (Bayliss 2014; Bresnihan 2015; Allen and Pryke 2013), as described in Chapter Two. 
ANT, Performativity and Political Mediations 
     ANT recognizes that the multiple translations required for the network to extend and endure 
also create “precarious links”, precarious because they are not carved in stone but rather can be 
undone, or fall apart. For instance, thousands across Europe have protested the new rash of 
multilateral trade agreements, currently at various stages of negotiation. Even a handful of 
countries have expressed serious qualms. Therefore, it’s still possible, at this stage, that 
globalized compulsory competitive tendering (GCCT) will not successfully translate into the 
network in Montreal, if the ratification stage of CETA fails (Sinclair and Trew 2014). And 
perhaps Montreal water users will protest the increasing commodification of their water within 
financial and global markets and refuse their own translation into the Montreal network too. 
Networks are both complex and precarious and as Law reminds, “All it takes is for one 
translation to fail and the whole web of reality unravels” (Law 2009, 145). 
     This is to say that all networks, emergent and otherwise, though realities, are not constants as 
they must forever weather the challenge of changing conditions and resistances as they bump up 
against other networks, as in the instance of Montreal’s former procurement network, described 
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in Chapter Four. Realities always carry the risk of failure, or as Judith Butler (2010) theorizes, 
“The risk of breakdown and disruption are constitutive to any and all performative operations” 
(cited in Callon 2010, 165).  As such, Butler has described the constant need to reinforce realities 
and repeat, reposition and retool scripts and practices because they are not constants. For Callon 
(2010) this requirement for repetition shows the experimental nature of realities in the form of 
market innovations. For in the repetition required to innovate, as in any experiment, anomalies 
occur (165). 
     ANT and Judith Butler understand that reality can never precisely be duplicated and this is 
where politics enters the network, in order to deal with the issues arising from those “misfires” 
that occur during reiteration i.e. the effort to reproduce a reality.  These bumps and cracks need 
smoothing over for political and economic realities to persuade and persist. Or, as Callon (2010) 
explains, “Discourses draw boundaries, exclude and reject, and it is in these mechanisms that the 
political dimension lies” (165). 
     Though politics is essential to enduring economic innovations, Butler observes how, in the 
presentation of the real, there is a persistent effort to keep politics and economics apart.  
Importantly, Callon (2010) asserts, this separation and redistribution requires certain conditions 
of “cognitive, material and institutional” inputs without which the redistribution and separation 
cannot continue (165). Chapter Two and Three consider the production of such inputs producing 
Neoliberal water-related procurement. Callon argues for how cognitive, material and institutional 
inputs are also political mediations that will never fully succeed according to Butler’s analysis; 
for to keep economy and politics apart proves impossible when the very definition of politics 
cannot be separated from that of economy (Callon 2010, 165). 
      Until recently, Murray (2009) reports that analysis of public procurement was rather narrow 
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and largely treated the public realm in the same way as the private, ignoring the salient difference 
of the politics and values particular to the public realm. Murray (2009) observes rightly however 
that “at national, supra-national and international levels public procurement sits within 
legislative, administrative and judicial frameworks and much of those frameworks have been set 
by politicians” (92). He concludes that “the influence of politicians on public procurement policy 
is pervasive” (92). 
     And yet, on the City’s website, the Mayor of Montreal, Denis Coderre, might suggest 
otherwise:   
I have often said that our city is not a parliament, but an administration. To this 
end, my vision is that the rigid discipline of political parties has no place in 
Montréal’s city council; I believe that elected officials must use their energy to 
serve their fellow citizens and not to debate political issues. It is important to get 
Montréal back on track. Together, we must stand up for our city’s growth and 
revive our pride in living in Montréal (Mayor Denis Coderre 2013, Ville de 
Montréal). 
 
     Here the Mayor appears to be saying that political debate as democratic process, is 
counterproductive to the economic well-being of Montreal. It is not surprising that democratic 
process is unwanted by some in Montreal when changing economic and political realities signal 
a redistribution of property rights from the public to the private and are therefore potentially a 
matter of multiple and opposing concerns and potential and incipient controversy.  Such matters, 
in fact, require constant political mediation, by the Mayor himself, among others.   
     This thesis considers the role of politics within the Network for realizing the financial and 
global marketization of the City’s Water Services via water-related infrastructure procurement: 
How do mediations and interventions to separate politics from water-related procurement appear 
in practice? What practices are being absented, externalized or both?  And what resistances have 
emerged; what counter practices and values?   
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     Recent procurement history facilitates this enquiry. Occasionally power relations are easier to 
observe because of an event that Callon has dubbed depunctualization: when a network fails to 
translate or maintain itself because it is sufficiently resisted or challenged; then the lid on the 
black box lifts to reveal the contents of the network, its inscriptions and other relations that can 
now be discerned (Callon 1991, 152). Otherwise, when inscriptions punctualize in a network, 
such a network is so taken for granted that the webs of relationships and inscriptions that 
materialize it are not apparent so that it can then be described as a black box (Graham 2010, 6). 
At this point the translations of the Network’s values are so thickly distributed that its problem 
solving logic becomes difficult to challenge. Graham (2010) maintains that “infrastructural 
disruptions provide important heuristic devices or learning opportunities through which critical 
social science can excavate the politics of urban life, technology or infrastructure in ways that are 
rarely possible when such systems are functioning normally” (3). In Montreal we see the 
depunctualization of the former local network for procurement of water-related infrastructure 
giving way to the punctualization of another, far more global and financial, creating more 
obvious opportunities for tracing network relations. This thesis shows that such a state of 
transition affords glimpses of the components and relations of both the old and the emergent 
network. 
ANT Research Methods and Data 
     In this thesis I identify, bring forth, and analyze a Network for the globalization and 
financialization of all water-related procurement that, via the Neoliberal translation of practices 
from different domains, is materializing the greater commodification of all water-related 
infrastructure including Water Services in Montreal. The thesis shows that these processes of 
commodification have absenting and externalizing effects on municipal democratic procedure. 
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     From a methodological point of view this thesis is anchored on the material semiotics 
described and discussed earlier in this chapter. It describes these emergent practices, their values 
and performance as translations of the object that is globalized and financialized water-related 
infrastructure procurement, an object that can be read and therefore scrutinized. These 
translations can be read because they are embedded with texts that are circulating and, in so 
doing, extend Neoliberal power by communicating and performing its values and problem 
solving culture in the form of conservation prescriptions, money, commodities, standards and 
water data. Apart from the few existing scholarly sources on the specific matters that this thesis 
explores and a few news reports, all of the data analyzed and texts presented in this thesis were 
accessed on the web in pdf or web page formats. 
     In order to fully tackle the complexity of the matter this thesis investigates, I developed an an-
alytical framework that complements and extends my reliance on the aforementioned method of 
material semiotics. It consisted in focusing my research and review on the following focal points: 
Actor Network Theory and critical financialization, globalization and public services commodifi-
cation theories.  These are drawn upon throughout the various chapters, as seen below.             
     I chose these theories because they enabled me to address the question of how Montreal’s 
water-related procurement is being financialized and globalized, and through these networked 
practices, increasingly commodified (i.e. turned into market assets). These literatures have shown 
the direct relation between increasing private access to public water-related infrastructure and 
limiting of public access. They have documented network effects of deteriorating services, 
labour conditions and democratic procedures at the point of services. A personalized history of 
how I first developed an interest in processes of water procurement in Montreal and subsequently 
in analysis the matter through the lens of these literatures sheds light on their pertinence within 
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the context of this thesis. 
     A reading of an article in the Socialist Register by Ursula Huws (2011) on the multiple 
practices of commodification of UK public services peaked my interest in the commodification 
processes at work in Montreal since 2009, notable for being the year that Montreal’s notorious 
procurement scandal erupted at the point of a water meters’ contract, the City’s largest contract 
ever.  At the time I was also reading newspaper articles around the prospective new trade 
agreement, CETA, and was alarmed by the lack of political response in the City to the proposed 
globalized compulsory competitive tendering it planned for municipal services. I had also been 
keen to do an ANT analysis since reading Bruno Latour’s Politics of Nature (2004) and to learn a 
method for showing the complexities of how realities materialize and power performs.  
     From there I found other ANT authors and their case studies of multiple and heterogenous 
actors extending power and problem solving cultures through webs of relations. I found these 
offered a useful parallel to the multiplicity and heterogeneity of practices globalizing and 
financializing Montreal water infrastructure. I also examined the application of ANT theories 
adopting a political economy in case studies of financialization of public services and the 
networked analysis of Portuguese mercantile imperialism of the 15th century, described above. I 
found I was also able to take other theory critical of the spread of financial values and global 
markets encroaching upon all public services and adapt them to an analysis of Montreal water-
related procurement.  With this combination and adoption of theories I created an overarching 
analytical framework for my thesis, which, as in the case of the instances above, also amounts to 
an ANT political economy.   
     In terms of my research process, ANT’s semiotic method, described previously, provided two 
more concepts crucial to this thesis: hinterlands (realities that make other realities possible) and 
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immutable mobiles (powerful values that can travel and attach to networks elsewhere) informing 
the materialization of new realities. Using these concepts, much of my process for addressing the 
question at hand was a matter of tracing a relatively small number of powerful values to their 
assembly in policy documents at supranational, federal, provincial and municipal levels of 
government, as well as in corporate knowledge-production networks. These institutional bodies 
perform as main mediators and much of the data analyzed and texts presented within the thesis 
were traceable to their websites in pdf or web page formats. 
      In addition to the method of going to main mediator sites I also looked at critical theory 
which provided new insights and new data detailing local effects and resistances to globalizing 
and financializing networks. This aspect of my approach also made apparent the theoretical 
ground already covered and the limits of existing analysis. While ultimately, two important 
findings emerged: the absence of any other comparable analysis of Montreal water, and also, at 
the point of writing, any thorough going analysis of the local emergent materialization of the 
UNEP Green Economy prescription for a new water calculation factoring in the cost of all water-
related infrastructure (including debt) into the market price of water. One can only imagine that 
other such studies are coming soon. 
     Of course this process was often a lot messier, complex and non-linear than I have suggested 
here, involving pathways I had not planned. However, these strayings often lead to new data 
revealing new Network relations and effects; and with my analytical model guiding me I was 
able to stay on task in terms of collecting the substantive data required in the form of the 
documents and sources mentioned above. Given the recursive nature of my analytical model, and 
its spreading over the various chapters that comprise this thesis, a brief synopsis is in order. 
     In Chapter Two, my analysis proceeds by detecting and describing the hinterlands of the key 
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practices of water procurement and their relations of the Network: that is, the new water pricing 
calculation, economies of scale (larger contracts for lower cost), globalized compulsory 
competitive tendering rules and high private debt leveraging.  The Chapter traces the immutable 
mobiles being mediated by governments, supranational agencies, corporations and political 
discourses within the logic of the Neoliberal problem solving culture. The Chapter reveals that 
textual traces of these immutable mobiles turn up in reports from water transnationals, 
supranational agencies, market tracking websites and the Canadian and European government 
websites on trade, among others. I have analyzed this material for Network mediations, relations 
and effects, translating water infrastructure as a globalizing, financializing, and therefore 
commodifying Green Economy. 
     The Chapter also draws upon recent reports from water and trade advocacy groups, media 
exposés and academic analysis for the social and environmental effects of the Network and the 
ontologies of water commodification practices. Importantly, the Chapter traces counter values to 
the Network and their translations into resistant, alternative practices within emergent networks. 
     In Chapter Three, this thesis demonstrates the Network’s particular local and emergent 
translations and relations of the four devices described above within Montreal’ water 
infrastructure procurement. The data I have gathered and analyzed here includes web-accessed 
supranational finance and water standards agencies, provincial and municipal water policy 
papers and strategies, municipal water reports and budgets, federal and provincial websites 
related to trade and procurement, municipal financial policy, water-related public-private 
partnership policy, water and trade advocacy reports and analysis, as well as public infrastructure 
privatization literature and think tank analysis. 
     The growth of globalizing and financializing (marketizing) culture in all levels of government 
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is shown as it increasingly opens water production up to private actors/practices, and asset 
creation for market exchange. In this context, I describe Montreal’s rather quiet mediation of the 
key emergent practices/devices, and analyze government and think tank texts as translations by 
the Network. In so doing I show technological practices like meters and leak detectors also being 
translated into the Network and the agentic relations they perform within it. 
     I present texts to demonstrate that this emergent procurement reality and Green Economy 
culture is materializing the following: the demise of Water Services managed via a more 
progressive, governmental property tax-based revenue system, in favour of a regressive 
tariffication of all users for all water-related infrastructure and large water debt. And in view of 
other prospective translations by the Network, I suggest that the Network trajectory is currently 
towards a full financialization that would place management of all water-related infrastructure 
outside municipal democratic decision-making structures, processes and redistributive practice, 
materializing it corporately and fully in line with market forces.     
     In Chapter Four, I analyze provincial and municipal government water-related strategies as 
well as terms of the CETA trade accord from the Canadian and EU government websites and 
critical analysis therein by civil society trade advocacy groups. I find that the new procurement 
practices, globalizing and financializing the values of water procurement are combining with 
new values to transform the social democratic culture that has previously translated services such 
as water with the value of a vertical equity, that sees higher property-tax payers contributing 
more to relieve the burden upon those with less.  I find the Network in Montreal is translating 
procurement practices with new prescriptions for what is ‘fair’ in a horizontal equity, in which all 
users pay equally for the water they use and all access is now conditional upon ability to pay the 
market price. I describe how technological practices are combining with conservation and 
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financial values to facilitate this transformation of social water-related values, facilitating the 
separation of politics from economy. 
     Reference to media reports and municipal communiques, council, executive and committee 
minutes shows that in Montreal the emergent globalization and financialization of all water-
related procurement, in a Neoliberal vein, is contributing to the translation of government as 
‘governance’ in the municipal administration: materializing private actors and absenting 
democratic procedures. It shows ways in which the absence of resistance to the transformation of 
Montreal’s Water Services into Water Economy is an effect of the Network itself. 
     The main contribution of this thesis is to deploy an ANT material semiotics to observe, record 
and analyze the new and emergent procurement practices and their relationality and values 
formatting potentially all Montreal water-related infrastructure into global and financial markets 












Tracing Hinterlands and Immutable Mobiles 
     Describing hinterlands (realities that make other realities possible) and tracing their 
immutable mobiles (powerful values), how they converge, and are worked together to 
materialize dominant realities and prescribe localized practices, is empirical analysis that can be 
done of the Network for the globalization and financialization of Montreal’s water-related 
procurement and its resistances.   
     Chapter Two considers hinterlands (existing realities) such as Neoliberalism that make the 
emerging reality of water-related procurement and key practices possible in Montreal. 
Hinterlands are described in terms of practices and their prescriptions e.g. Neoliberalism’s 
translation of Green Economy that prescribes water conservation via water’s full marketization. 
It should be noted here, that though Neoliberalism is shown here as a powerful hinterland, it is 
also a massive network of networks, enlisting actors (and their networks), translating practices 
for its own ends and with a view to sustaining and growing its own power. As a hinterland, 
however, it functions as a powerful source of immutable mobiles delivering values and 
prescriptions to far flung places, including Montreal.   
     Chapter Two describes how Neoliberal prescriptions for globalization and financialization 
target the full marketization of local water infrastructure that includes water production and 
delivery. It shows how this reality has involved the rise of the Public Service Industry, the 
financial markets and international trade harmonization as well as the materialization of Green 
Economy. Relations are analyzed that show real and potential effects on both local procurement 
and democratic procedures with the Network’s insinuation into governmental decision-making 
processes. Counter scripts are also analyzed in the materialization of resistances to such practices 
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of water-related procurement and its dilution of the Water Commons via the creation of 
commodities. 
Hinterlands of GCCT in Montreal Water 
     One key practice composing Montreal’s new procurement for Water Services, slowly 
materializing since 2009, is contained within the terms of a new trade agreement currently being 
ratified between Canada and the European Union. If finalized in 2016/2017, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) will introduce the globalization of compulsory 
competitive tendering (GCCT) of goods and services.  Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
denotes a policy for public sector organizations to allow private sector firms to tender for the 
delivery of public services in competition with any internal delivery by the public sector itself. 
The intention of CCT was to introduce market forces into the public realm (A Dictionary of 
Human Resource Management, 2008, Oxford Reference Online, www.oxfordreference.com). Its 
globalization in the instance of CETA signals the permission extended to all private EU firms to 
bid on all government procurement contracts for service provision over a certain dollar 
threshold.i 
     The aim of CETA is to effectively integrate the single market of the 28 states of the EU with 
that of Canada at all levels of government, in many sectors of trade, in foreign direct investment, 
as well as areas of finance and procurement of goods and services. Its proponents have 
celebrated the access that Canadian business will have to the world’s largest economy while the 
EUs water-related firms can celebrate access to, among other things, Canadian municipally 
tendered contracts. CETA, arguably, announces a significant economic transformation to Canada 
in 2017. How has this state of affairs materialized and what are some of its anticipated effects for 
Water Services (Transnational Institute 2014; Public Services International 2015; CETA, Global 
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Affairs Canada)? 
     The 1980’s saw the rise of Neoliberalism as an ideology and policy prescription for member 
states of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral policy bodies, promoting 
a massive structural adjustment with a view to enlarging markets.  What began in the UK and US 
has assumed various forms in many countries around the globe since (Gamble 2007).  
Neoliberalism replaced Industrial Policy with Competition Policy, which in practice meant 
replacing nationalization of industry, state subsidized industry and public services with 
privatization, incentives to corporations, and the opening up of trade between Nation-states, 
known as liberalization.  Proponents have increasingly viewed previous government policy 
scripts of local development, full employment, social equality and social justice as potential 
barriers to the primacy and performance of competition and marketization within growing global 
free trade zones. This is the Neoliberal translation of globalization (Gamble 2007; Brennan 2012, 
3-4).   
     As mentioned above, Neoliberalism has different strands but the “social market” strand that 
understands “the role of the state to be the champion and defender of the free market, by 
enabling the institutions it requires and empowering its agents” is hegemonic at this time 
(Gamble 2007). Its policy orientation was dubbed “New Public Management” which amounted 
to shedding the public sector of what was translated as its onerous bureaucracy and remaking it 
with qualities associated with the private such as innovation, entrepreneurism, productivity and 
efficiency. CCT and GCCT have been two devices introduced with the intention of achieving 
such ends (A Dictionary of Human Resource Management, 2008, Oxford Reference Online, 
www.oxfordreference.com).  Fiscal discipline and tax reforms in favour of business were also 
imposed (Bakker 2014, 474; Tax Justice Network).   
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     Using such scripts, Neoliberalism has spawned practices and devices to generate and 
concentrate wealth with the effect of redistributing property rights from public sectors to private 
sectors (François-Xavier Merrien 1999; Harvey 2003, 74).  Neoliberal transfer of public services 
into private hands has been theorized by Harvey (2003) as an “accumulation by dispossession”, 
in a reworking of Marx’s “primitive accumulation” (74-75). Primitive accumulation denotes 
processes of land privatization, and suppression of rights to the Commons, indigenous forms of 
production and consumption, among other means (74-75).  For Harvey (2003), “the predation, 
fraud, and violence” that Marx (1887, 506-543) ascribed to the primitive or original stage of 
accumulation is, in fact, recurrent via processes of globalization and marketizaton. Relatedly, 
Huws (2011) describes universel public services as “the results of past struggles by workers for 
the redistribution of surplus value [profit]” (64). Huws (2011), however, focusses on the 
expropriation of public services via processes of commodification of use values, in which use 
values are turned into exchange values, as a kind of “secondary primitive accumulation” (64). 
She details how, for the workers delivering public services, there is a general deterioration in 
working conditions, the depletion of public sector union strength and its bargaining power, 
further dissipated by globalization’s materialization of a global and more precarious labor force 
(64-84). 
     The logic of globalization for both governments and corporations is that in order to continue 
to accumulate, they need new market access in order to buy up or merge with existing firms 
(Brennan 2012, 37).  As such, globalization and trade liberalization are central pillars orienting 
the Neoliberal regime.  Globalization requires the incremental networking of global financial 
markets involving communications’ innovations, global trading-enabling strategies in round the 
clock markets that now never sleep. Liberalization requires the increasing deregulation of money 
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and capital markets, access to foreign procurement by governments and firms of goods and 
services and foreign direct investment in other states (FDI) and the relaxation of rules (laws and 
regulations) around investment practices within markets, organizations and monopolies, and 
procurement that is now to include municipalities.ii 
     Processes of globalization, liberalization and their networks of power have transformed the 
nature of the state and its procurement practices. The European Union has gone furthest down 
this road of economic integration: Economist Giandomenico Majone coined the term the 
‘regulatory state’ to theorize the new role of government in the European Union; in this 
description government is not about deliberative democracy or social redistribution of wealth 
(Majone 1998,28).  Majone’s (1999) normative theory understands the role of the state as that of 
materializing power-sharing with other regulatory bodies (commissions, banks and courts) and 
extending corporate influence within the public realm (1-2). For Follesdal and Hix (2006), the 
role of regulatory governance is ultimately “about addressing market failures and so, by 
definition, producing policy outcomes […] where some benefit and no one is made worse off”. 
(538) In Europe the European Commission produces practices including policy that materializes 
the European market (i.e. a single market and a single monetary policy), the harmonization of 
goods and service standards and environmental safety regulations.   
     For Majone (1998), with the absented role of majoritarian government (political majority 
rule) when problems arise, the role of the regulatory government i.e. the European Commission 
is not to impose structural change or redistribute power but rather to fix problems procedurally 
with promises of more transparent decision-making by technical experts. In other words, Majone 
(1998) sees solutions to problems arising as a matter of re-setting of standards (1-2). Follesdal 
and Hix (2006) summarize the role of non-majoritarian government, in this regard, which is to 
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distance the political from economy, since the political is deemed obstructive, and to materialize 
the conditions, processes and procedures that further consensus and marketization (538). This 
embrace of the private sector within governance practices is embedded with efficiency scripts 
that are to offset the absenting of redistributive policy that would address inequalities. Majone 
(1998) reasons that “Efficiency-oriented policies attempt to increase the aggregate welfare of 
society while redistributive policies are designed to improve the welfare of one particular group 
in society at the expense of other groups” (28).    
     In this regulatory, Neoliberal orientation, as Swyngedouw (2005) observes, “Governments are 
not just instrumental as initiators and facilitators of privatization; they also play a central role in 
guaranteeing profitability or insuring companies against adverse political or economic 
conditions” (91). To this end, competition and efficiency scripts have been used to insinuate 
corporate interests into governments, in the form of unelected agencies, to which governments 
delegate key decision-making functions and responsibilities, deploying the term governance to 
capture the role of these new unelected decision making agencies (Swyngedouw 2005b, 1991). 
     This move from government to governance has seen a creeping ‘corporatization’ a term used 
to denote the practice of a para-government body controlling infrastructural practices and 
delegating public funds, an increasing trend across the globe and in Canada and Montreal too 
(McDonald 2014). Such para-government entities, to varying degrees, can include private 
interests. PPP Canada Inc. is one such instance. Created as a Crown corporation with an 
independent Board of Directors from the private sector, reporting through the Minister of 
Finance to Parliament, its stated mandate is “to improve the delivery of public infrastructure by 
offering better value, timeliness and accountability to taxpayers, through Public Private 
Partnerships”. Water infrastructure is a large part of its mandate (PPP Canada, 
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http://www.p3canada.ca/). 
     The Global Policy Forum, an independent watchdog, monitoring the work of the United 
Nations and other global policy making bodies, has observed that “Corporate actors have been 
granted privileged access to decision-makers, and their interests have become more prominent as 
calls for legally binding instruments for [transnational corporations] become more sidelined” 
(The Global Policy Forum, Corporate Influence, www.globalpolicy.org/corporate-
influence/52644-gpf-analysis-on-corporate-influence.html). 
     Wilks and Bartle (2002) maintain, “A consequence of delegation has been to narrow the 
criteria employed by agencies so that the old, broad, balancing public interest criteria have been 
replaced by a far narrower and dogmatic focus on market efficiency” (170). These practices and 
their networks have endured despite early signs of their market inefficiency. In the UK, for 
instance, a detailed study of the impact of compulsory competitive tendering in local government 
in the UK 1993-1994 (The Gender Impact of CCT in Local Government, Manchester, GOC, 
1995) registered a total net loss of 126 million pounds in revenue, contrasting the savings of 20-
25% savings promised by the IMF, OECD, World Bank and UK government (Huws 2011, 69; 
Patterson and Pinch 2000). 
     In Canada, Brennan (2012) has charted the subsequent power redistribution that has emerged 
via the mercurial rise of Canadian corporations thanks to trade and investment liberalization 
policies, noting that in 1950, the average profit of a firm within the top 60 corporations was 234 
times larger than an average firm (4). By 2007, that ratio had risen to 14,278. This new balance 
of power is also associated with the deterioration in unionization, wages, conditions and labour’s 
over-all bargaining power (Brennan 2012, 4).  Brennan (2012) notes that “The concentration of 
corporate power into the boardrooms of a few firms has helped shape Canada’s political 
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economy.” 
     Recent studies show an increase in net income inequality in advanced economies which 
according to the IMF (2015) indicates “gaps” in current tax-and-transfer systems, with 
progressivity of tax systems having declined in the past few decades. The result being that high-
income households and corporations now contribute lower effective tax rates (Hungerford 2013) 
(IMF 2015, 21). The same study also finds a correlation between rising income share of the top 
10th percentile and increasing labour market deregulation and consequent labour market 
flexibility “likely reflecting the fact that labor market flexibility benefits the rich and reduces the 
bargaining power of lower-income workers” (IMF 2015, 26). 
     Neoliberalism’s ideological performance of market efficiency has filtered out social 
obligations in favour of filtering in market obligations, a trend that intensified from 1995 and the 
creation of the World Trade Organization. With the elimination of trade barriers uppermost in 
mind, 128 state leaders that year gave the WTO a free hand to mediate as required. General 
Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) resulted: liberalizing, outsourcing and/or directly 
privatizing health, transport, energy, education, water and so on, in most of Europe, although to 
the degree decided by the member state (Gamble 2007; WTO).   
     Abiding by GATS transparency and fairness requirements, procurement has nevertheless 
remained a means of economic leverage available to governments for local economic 
development and job creation (Shrybman 2010, 7).  However, the trade agreements currently 
under negotiation are highly controversial for being that much more restrictive in terms of the 
amount of government policy space they lay claim to, and the power they leave to elected 
governments to govern.  Government, critics observe, is increasingly being reduced to a 
regulatory function. As Gamble (2007) notes, “This means placing basic principles of the market 
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order in a category where they are beyond the reach of the elected government of the day.” This 
also means, in practice, putting procurement decisions well beyond the reach of local citizens. In 
these regards, the spirit of the ‘regulatory state’ is clearly apparent within the terms of the new 
breed of multilateral trade agreements that are currently at various stages of ratification 
(Transnational Institute 2014). 
     The largest trade accord since the North American Free Trade Accord (NAFTA) of 1994, 
CETA, if fully ratified in 2016, is likely to be most felt at the local municipal level, as it 
harmonizes and enforces globalized compulsory competitive tendering (GCCT or international 
procurement) for many services at certain thresholds for the very first time. The report “Trading 
Away Democracy” describes how CETA also grants corporations sweeping new powers to 
challenge domestic laws and regulations that they can argue limit their profits. To this end CETA 
borrows from NAFTA a system of corporate tribunals (Inter State Dispute Settlement) that are 
available only to foreign investors, sidestepping domestic courts and barring citizen input 
(Eberhardt et al 2014).  As reported in the Huffington Post 15/11/2015, ISDS allows corporations 
to sue all levels of government for, say, improving the conditions of workers, if such 
improvement were to lower investor returns, as in the case of Veolia’s ongoing legal suit against 
Egypt for raising the minimum wage for its public sector workers in Alexandria from the 
equivalent of $56 to $99 per month. 
     Barlow (2015) reports that corporations have used this mechanism to challenge government 
policies over 600 times and, in a number of cases, against laws or regulations designed to protect 
water and the human right to water. These include a challenge where a government set a ceiling 
on the price of water so that the poor would have Water Services (11). Other critics have pointed 
out that foreign corporations already have non-discriminatory access to all levels of government 
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procurement in Canada by EU firms. iii Municipalities would generally not refuse a bid from a 
European firm and there’s the prominent presence of French water transnationals Veolia and 
Suez in many cities of Quebec including Montreal to suggest as much, as seen in the following 
chapter.  Even UN experts have recently concluded that judging from the nature of ISDS 
settlements that “the regulatory function of many States and their ability to legislate in the public 
interest have been put at risk” (Barlow 2015, 15). 
     Sinclair and Trew for the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) point out that 
Chapter 21 of CETA forbids municipalities specifying any local content requirements for the 
contracts that fall above the negotiated thresholds and that such provisions underwrite the true 
objective of CETA stated as “unconditional access”. Such commitments in their view “will 
substantially restrict the vast majority of provincial and municipal government bodies from using 
public spending as a catalyst for achieving other societal goals, from creating good jobs to 
supporting local farmers to addressing the climate crisis” (Sinclair and Trew 2014, 25). 
     To speed up the process of liberalization, in 2011, 50 countries, dubbing themselves “The 
Very Good Friends of Services” came together to bypass the WTO rules of negotiation and to 
fast-track a new trade accord for services. Opponents to CETA find that the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA) not only presents an intensification of competition and access by new states 
and their firms but also newly introduces a provision whereby any service or part of a service 
once commodified or privatized is prevented from returning to the public sector via a “ratchet” 
or “standstill” mechanism, in this way tightening the grip of private property law and global 
water-related service providers over procurement. Relatedly, TISA would also prevent monopoly 
provision of regional or local services such as municipal water supply (Public Services 
International 2014, 104-105; TISA, Wikileaks). TISA’s potential impact upon water make it 
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most abundantly clear that the Network for the globalization and financialization of water-related 
procurement is also a Network for the greater marketization (or commodification) of water-
related services. 
     As signs of the change underway these trade agreements are big and visible despite efforts to 
keep them beneath the public radar.  Many civil society organizations and municipalities have 
demanded inclusion in negotiating these new trade agreements and/or exemption of some or all 
of the terms related to procurement. In October 2014, over 1,100 actions were organized in 22 
European countries to reject these trade deals that the EU is negotiating (Sinclair and Trew 
2014). 
     Hundreds of civil society organizations in Europe and Canada have expressed their 
fundamental concerns with the predicted constraints upon government strategic procurement and 
democratic practice that these constraints would imply (Trew 2013, 575; ATTAC). As Scott and 
Trew (2014) note, “Canada has made these extensive procurement commitments for municipal 
governments at a time when local governments in Europe are demanding more space to use 
public spending as a catalyst for social and economic development.” (26). While in Montreal, the 
network for the new procurement for Water Services seems to have been formatting from at least 
2009 the materialities that would accommodate the globalized compulsory competitive tendering 
in CETA (and other agreements being negotiated). 
     Chapter Two thus far has shown transnational actors of the network producing practices and 
their texts in the form of policy, regulations and trade agreements that are embedded with scripts 
that equate efficiencies with growing competition and the procurement of public services for 
global markets. Chapters Three and Four will describe ways in which CETA’s particular 
translation of globalized compulsory competitive tendering can work with three other 
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procurement devices and their network relations to format for the further globalization and 
financialization of water management in Montreal. 
Neoliberal Procurement: Hinterlands of Montreal’s Restructuring for Economies of Scale 
    A simple definition of economies of scale is the greater production of a good or service for less 
cost per unit. ivThis case study translates the economies of scale being realized in Montreal as a 
sign of an emergent network for the globalization and financialization of Montreal’s water-
related procurement practices. It understands restructuring for economies of scale at the point of 
Water Services as a contemporary feature of how procurement contracts are being specified and 
valued. The adoption of economies of scale practices are also how municipal management is 
transforming in conjunction with the rise of the public service industry (PSI), signifying private 
participation in public service delivery (Huws and Podro 2012, 6). 
     Unlike the wholesale sell off of public assets such as public utilities, another feature of the 
early 1980’s, outsourcing, did not involve a real change of ownership, but rather the introduction 
of the practice of compulsory competitive tendering, inviting private service delivery into the 
state’s operation. This required public services, with their intrinsic use value, newly being 
subject to a process of economization in order to turn them into commodities with a market value 
that could then be tendered by government and delivered by firms that transformed them into 
assets to be traded on the public services markets by firms and investors. Bayliss (2014) points 
out that until the 80’s, the public status of Water Services was justified on the grounds that they 
were monopolistic in structure, difficult to value and commodify and were therefore 
unmarketable.  In the economic downturn of the 70’s and with the rise of Neoliberalism’s New 
Public Management the high cost of public water provision came under fire. Since the 80’s 
Bayliss (2014) describes how “Privatization has become a core policy with proponents arguing 
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that it will make water utilities more efficient and prices more cost-reflective” (294).   
     The Transnational Public Service Industry identifies those firms that specialize in the private 
management and/or delivery of public services within domains of energy, health and water for all 
levels of government in many advanced and emerging economies. In April 2014 the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports the steady growth of the PSI 
industry in a climate in which, “Services are increasingly being traded internationally, reaching 
4.7 trillion dollars of global exports in 2013 and recording a 5% annual growth (current prices),” 
Compare this to only 2% increase in merchandise (UNCTAD 2014).  While in 2014 the revenue 
of the world’s largest Water Services transnational, Veolia, rose 4.9% to €23.8 billion, due to 
strong growth in the United States, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East (Veolia Annual Report 
2014, 6). An important question for this case study is how economies of scale are pertinent to the 
greater marketization of Montreal water.  How have governments and PSI growth materialized 
economies of scale and what are the effects of this reality upon water-related goods, services and 
local conditions?   
     Following the financial crisis of 2008-2009 the desire by states to reduce deficits incurred by 
bailing out the banks legitimized cost cutting and the search for efficiencies. Economies of scale 
at the point of procurement was one popular efficiency device used in the massive restructuring 
of public services that required corporations with the capacity to deliver. It is no accident that the 
two largest water transnationals, Veolia and Suez, originated in France whose cities have largely 
outsourced their water. The profit or value added for outsourcing is huge, largely owing to what 
has been a steady increase in government spending in all OECD countries, both overall and as a 
percentage of GDP and this despite cuts to services and the sale of public industry: OECD.Stat 
Extracts show that in 1960, government spending was an average 28.4% of GDP across the 
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OECD, by 1980 43.8% and by 2010 Canada spending was 44.08%, not very far behind the 
European average for 2011 of 49.37% (Huws 2011, 68).  Huws observes that given the profits to 
be made, it seems that capital has “a vested interest in encouraging the growth of privately 
delivered public services. And it stands to reason that the potential for market expansion is 
greatest in those countries and regions that have built the most comprehensive welfare states” 
(Huws 2011, 68). 
     One effect of this trend has been the ‘hollowing out’ of government services to make space 
for the private. Or in other words, the externalization of public services and the internalization of 
corporate services by offering an integrated delivery capable of covering all the production 
aspects in waste processing and water and energy production.  The world’s largest water related 
transnational understands the growth potential of this orientation: Veolia’s “new strategic plan” 
explains that, “We have positioned ourselves differently—for example, with a single offer 
spanning water, waste and energy—and we innovate continuously to make sure we stay in the 
lead and stand out” (Veolia Annual Report 2014, 6). 
     Importantly, economies of scale are only possible because of the processes that have 
standardized goods, services and infrastructure making them interchangeable and easy to 
reproduce in quantity and exchange on the markets. The more generic and standardized that 
services have become the more readily they have fit into any economic sector be it 
manufacturing, retail or utilities. Huws relates how since the mid 90’s, transnationals have grown 
thanks to the ease with which new information and communication technologies are able to 
relocate economic activities and manage them at a distance in far-flung local realities (Huws 
2011, 66, 71). Huws also spotlights the practices of knowledge commodification in the public 
sector that include the stripping, codifying, and placement into standardized databases so that not 
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only can knowledge be transferred to cheaper employees, it can also be used as an asset that is 
then commodified by the new employer. She describes how “Once the expertise has been 
commodified the more mature and experienced workers can be replaced by a younger more 
malleable workforce grateful for whatever security it can get” (Huws 2011, 78).   
     Standardization and market access work hand in glove to realize economies of scale, as Huws 
explains, for “the larger the market for these services is, and the more that standardization can be 
achieved, then the lower the price will become” (Huws 2011, 67). For Huws there’s “a harsh 
economic logic” here, and that is standardization’s economies of scale, more often than not, 
privilege large transnationals at the expense of smaller more local companies. While industry and 
consumers are often won over by the quality claims of standards and the documentation ensuring 
they are of a consistent quality when compared against equivalents of the same class. v 
     A report by Suez in North America, relates increasing standards to increasing investment.  
Under the heading “Targeting New Objectives” the point is made that, “Stricter standards will 
ultimately demand upgrades that require various forms of investment” (14).vi  Suez understands 
standards setting and certification to be a market driver. Importantly, only standardized goods 
and services can be traded as assets on the markets. 
     Processes of metrology and standardization have been central to materializing this hyper 
local-to-local connectivity called globalization. Metrology is about making relations 
commensurable and coordinated, allowing for standardization procedures and Latour invokes the 
importance of metrology and standards in extending networks because once things are 
commensurable they can be coordinated and enlisted into networks via standardization 
processes. In fact, Latour describes how “As soon as local and global disappears, the central 
importance of standards and the immense advantages we draw from metrology—in the widest 
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acceptance of the term—become obvious” (Latour 2005, 228). Here Latour alludes to how 
tracing the circulation of metrology and standardization within universal networks is an 
operation that can be done “for other less traceable, less materialized circulations [because] most 
coordination among agents is achieved through the dissemination of quasi-standards.” To 
illustrate, he asks, “What would be the state of any economic activity without accounting codes 
and summaries of best practices?” (Latour 2005, 229). Similarly, procurement demands 
increasing standardized specifications to cater to a globalizing compulsory competitive 
tendering. 
     Stricter procurement practices, functioning as quasi-standards, encouraging economies of 
scale, are agreed by CETA’s Article II.6 that imposes valuation rules barring municipalities from 
dividing up contracts into separate, smaller contracts with the purpose of escaping the CETA 
thresholds.  While Article II.7 takes the orientation a step further requiring that recurring 
contracts are gathered into a single unit of tender to bring them within the CETA regulation. It 
seems likely that such regulation will restrict the growth capacity of smaller local businesses 
(Trew and Sinclair 2014, 26). And Veolia, for instance, seems to be cutting its cloth accordingly: 
In 2015 Veolia states its new strategic plan “to target large-scale environmental markets” and 
“concentrate on the most dynamic geographic regions” that require “large scale investment”. 
Infrastructural contracts would fall within this remit to include upgrading Montreal’s water 
supply and sewage pipes for instance, as seen in Chapter Three.  The corporation’s new 
“promising outlook” relies upon “refocusing on the most profitable sectors” (Veolia Annual 
Report 2014, 6, 7, 15).     
     None of the above is to deny the general agreement there appears to be that standards make a 
significant contribution, as noted by CEN, a standardization organization in Europe: “standards 
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are important tools for improving environmental sustainability, and worker and consumer 
protection. They complement Europe for companies and other actors to respect relevant 
legislation.”vii  For critics, however, the dominance of a market-based emphasis arises from who 
exactly decides standards and what is done with them: McDonald (2015) points to critiques of 
the standards-setting by benchmarking organizations that decide what standards are to be taken 
into account. Benchmarking denotes the practice of performance measurement via the process of 
comparing standards across industry or services in private and increasingly public sectors: 
“benchmarking organizations are stacked with large multinational corporations acting in their 
own interests, shaping ‘international standards’ across a wide swath of topics, from 
environmental sustainability to corporate governance” (89).   
     McDonald explains one related concern: the use of benchmarking organizations for the 
promotion of commercialisation of Water Services by allowing water corporations to dominate 
processes of standards setting and policy making; The International Standards Organization, the 
largest and oldest of these organizations, with its 260 standards “has been called little more than 
a “corporate private regime”. Which relates to another concern that “benchmarking practices are 
anti-democratic, conducted by ‘experts’ with little effort to include citizens or workers in the 
evaluation process” (McDonald 2015, 89). 
     A third critique derived from the latter is that emphasis on universal performance 
harmonization, with the help of various international agencies and trade agreements, undermines 
the particularities of local conditions including political and cultural differences. The ISO’s 260 
performance metrics informs the basis of many benchmarkings around the globe but the 
organization is criticized for its Eurocentric and corporate character, as well as the prohibitive 
cost for some of acquiring its standards.  McDonald (2015) comments that “Mainstream 
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benchmarking systems are so deeply embedded in market ideology and so inherently 
technocratic as to make them difficult to reconcile with the aims of public, transparent and 
equitable Water Services” (McDonald 2015, 90).  The question arises as to how to derive and 
apply benchmarks that deter corporate and municipal water practices and efficiency claims 
predicated upon job insecurity, the absence of citizen oversight, prohibitive water costs for the 
least well off, and the hollowing out of public services in favour of outsourcing. 
     The European Commission has not helped address the question. Friends of the Earth report 
that “Despite on-going discussions on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the EU for a 
decade and a half, the EU does not have a coherent and robust policy on CSR. This means there 
are no clear standards for European companies and financiers when they operate outside EU 
boundaries. The Commission’s strategy is, instead, to rely on companies acting on a voluntary 
basis” (Friends of the Earth 2015, 6). 
     Under CETA, utilities’ tenders over $657,000 and construction over $8.2 million prohibit 
municipalities from insisting upon local content requirements. Without local content 
requirements, and all other factors being equal, the lowest bid becomes the decisive factor. Trew 
and Sinclair have argued in response to “unconditional access” provisions that “assessing the 
overall benefits of a [procurement bid] in terms of job creation, increased taxes, opportunities for 
marginalized groups, and environmental benefits would provide a more accurate cost accounting 
and superior value for money than simply going with the lowest bid without local spin-offs and 
community impacts” (Trew and Sinclair 2014, 26-27). 
     EU municipalities have carved their municipal drinking Water Services out of CETA 
procurement rules. Paris has entirely remunicipalized all its services bar for one. Some 
municipalities have even entered into public-public partnerships with other municipalities or 
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non-profits that involve pooling resources, mutual support, practical help and combining 
contracts to benefit from the economies of scale that can be had without compromising public 
oriented values; France Eau Publique is an institutional body that gathers a number of French 
public operators in this way (Kishimoto, Petitjean and Lobina 2015, 116). While Brazil’s water 
management policy has adopted principles of equity, universality and public participation. 
McDonald (2015) describes how the Municipal Services Project has extended and transformed 
such values into ‘normative criteria’ for measuring performance of public services worldwide. 
But adds that such broad principles still need to be translated into concrete indicators for an 
everyday analysis of water management practices that systemically foregrounds issues such as 
public equity, solidarity and access (McDonald 2015, 91-92).   
     Montreal, however, seems to be moving against this current.  My analysis of water-related 
procurement and its finance and restructuring practices underway in the City’s Water Services 
points to likely signs that the municipality is standardizing to further commodify its Water 
Services for the markets and to procure larger contracts from larger foreign transnationals for the 
economies of scale they have to offer. Such materialities are analyzed more fully in Chapter 
Three.   
Hinterlands of a New Pricing Calculation for Montreal Water Production 
     In this analysis the hinterland for Montreal’s new pricing calculation for water is sourced 
most readily to scripts of both water scarcity and the UN’s “Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development” of 1992 that determined, “managing water as an economic good is an 
important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging protection and 
conservation of water resources” (UN 1992, 4). Such designations have been described as a 
matter of hegemony among powerful mediators, and their mediations often in the form of 
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knowledge production (Bakker and Furlong 2010b, 16-17). From the point of view of this 
material semiotics, I describe the part played by the immutable mobiles of the Network for 
water-related infrastructure procurement. 
     Knowledge mediation for the global economy starts at the international level with 
interventions by such bodies as the UN, the IMF and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) that produce studies that support policy prescriptions and judgements 
in the form of various reports, conferences and working groups.viii ix  Such mediations have 
materialized and performed powerful prescriptions influencing, among other practices, the 
economic policies of member states in the marketization of water production. 
     UN studies have found, for instance, that global water use has been growing at twice the rate 
of population growth and they conclude that this rate of loss of water biodiversity is 
unsustainable in conditions of water scarcity.x 
     The UN shows in “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015” that international 
interventions have since 1990 substantially decreased the percentile of populations drinking 
untreated water, however, it’s still the case that “Water scarcity affects 40 per cent of people in 
the world and is projected to increase” (UN 2015, 8). The UN translates the script of water 
scarcity as any shortage of water that can take all or any of three forms: “Scarcity can be physical 
(lack of water of sufficient quality), economic (lack of adequate infrastructure, due to financial, 
technical or other constraints) or institutional (lack of institutions for a reliable, secure and 
equitable supply of water)” (UN 2015, 55). Of course, it’s possible that all three forms of 
scarcity can materialize within the same communities. 
     The UN’s Green Economy Initiative has determined that the problem of water scarcity is a  
failure to assign a monetary value to nature in its forms of energy resources and bio and water 
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purification.  In its calculation a ‘true value’ is a market value, a concept predicated upon the idea 
of efficient markets. Quiggin referencing Fama (1970) explains that “Broadly speaking, the 
efficient markets hypothesis says that the prices generated by financial markets represent the best 
possible estimate of the values of the underlying assets.” And so these values are designated 
“true values” which are expected to rise once factors like scarcity and the increasing costs of 
purification and delivery are fully factored into the overall value, driving up stock prices and, 
costs to the consumers of services. Increasing costs of water consumption is reckoned to 
encourage consumers to conserve (Quiggin 2009, 240).   
     The marketization of precious resources underlies the Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity (TEEB), an international initiative hosted by the United Nations Environment 
Programme and supported by the European Commission, Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Japan. TEEB aims to calculate the monetary worth of 
ecosystems (Kaufman 2012, 470). 
     This is done with the help of scripts of ‘full cost recovery’ and ‘user-pay’ that, in the first case, 
value and price all aspects of production and in the second make the user responsible for paying 
the price, ensuring a source of revenue.  The conservation logic follows that in the process, 
consumers, once persuaded of the higher value of water related goods and services and, feeling 
the pinch, use the resource more sparingly and sustainably, encouraging the continued possibility 
of access to the natural resources over time (Furlong 2012, 2723).  Addressing economic scarcity 
is posited as addressing the problem of physical scarcity. The overall global process is expected 
to produce revenues for conservation innovations via the production and standardization of green 
(infrastructural) commodities. This process of commodification renders water related goods and 
services fit for the financial markets, given that only standardized commodities can be traded on 
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the financial markets; and this opens drinking water up to market speculation. 
      In order to fully marketize water via its infrastructure, a new pricing calculation was 
necessary to factor in full production costs, accounting for the gamut of infrastructural upgrades 
estimated. As explained in the 2015 UNEP development report, “Water for a Sustainable World”: 
“In the area of service delivery, prices or tariffs are usually linked to volumetric measures of 
water. Yet, prices in this area do not represent the scarcity value of the water as such but the cost 
of its delivery in a clean state” (UNEP 2015, 102).  The type of water scarcity alluded to here is 
economic scarcity. In UNEP’s view economic scarcity must be fully quantified and calculated 
for water production to be delivered efficiently by the markets, “A Green Economy that values 
environmental assets, employs pricing policies and regulatory changes to translate these values 
into market incentives, and adjusts the economy’s measure of GDP for environmental losses, is 
essential to ensuring the well-being of current and future generations” (UNEP 2011, 2). This is to 
say that to address economic water scarcity, water production and its infrastructure must be 
commodified: codified, standardized and priced.   
     In order to fully marketize water via its infrastructure, enormous investment is required and 
governments are lining up to produce the promise of figures to this effect. According to the 
Economist (22/03/2014) Globally, water infrastructure (e.g. pipes, acquaducs, valves, services) is 
said to require 40 trillion by 2020 to bring it up to standard.xi Canada’s infrastructural deficit 
alone is estimated at between $123 billion and $145 billion.xii 
     The new calculation seems set to generate a proliferation of water related commodities and 
conservation innovations, that will effectively transfer huge amounts of public revenue from the 
public to the private sectors, given the dovetailing of demand and procurement realities via trade 
agreements described above. 
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     Bakker (2014) distinguishes between valuation of water and its commodification, clarifying 
that they are not synonymous processes, explaining that the full commodification of water “only 
occurs when private property rights, full-cost pricing, and marketization (the introduction of 
water markets as trading mechanisms) are in place” (133 - 134, 482). However, it is posited here 
that since the new pricing calculation for water production no longer isolates the valuation of 
water in its clean state from the infrastructure that provides it, in this sense valuation and 
commodification processes in Water Services do appear to have become synonymous, to the 
degree that water goods, services and labour are outsourced. 
     I argue that the new pricing calculation for water production costs functions as the kind of 
tool produced by economists and intended “to take into account in more and more detail a set of 
entities and relationships which were hitherto excluded from the framework of calculation” 
(Callon 1998, 24). By extension, it presents a powerful device for generating commodities when 
“Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things and social 
relations, that a price can be put on them and that they can be traded subject to legal contract” 
(Harvey 2005, 165). If market environmentalism endeavours to perform an extension of property 
rights over all of nature, the new pricing calculation is a key device extending both property 
rights and the markets into water production. Enlisted as a device for valuing public water 
utilities, it contributes to processes of accumulation by dispossession evoked earlier, 
transforming the Water Commons into commodities (Harvey 2003; Huws 2011). 
     Proponents of Green Economy have anticipated great things: better jobs and environmental 
recovery in a program that would sustainably realize millennium goals thanks to “the benefit 
flows that arise from natural capital that are received directly by the poor” (UNEP 2011, 5). 
However, in the view of its opponents, such as Association pour une taxe sur les transactions 
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financières et pour l’action citoyenne (ATTAC) the Green Economy is nothing short of 
capitalism’s “new cycle of expansion”.xiii 
     Certainly, when municipalities introduce the new calculation along with the scripts of full cost 
recovery, user-pay and globalized compulsory competitive tendering, they will be deepening the 
exposure and connection of private and foreign transnationals to local individual customers, who 
can ensure water related industries a reliable source of revenue from increasing innovations and 
standards. Economic water scarcity can be seen as a powerful script encouraging the power of 
TNCs more assuredly into municipal procurement markets. 
    Significantly, this network for the commodification of Water Services includes governments 
deregulating and re-regulating to create the institutional framework and guarantees favourable 
for absorbing nature into international markets. Furlong and Bakker (2010b) have pointed to the 
“near-hegemonic status” of liberal or “market environmentalism” among international policy 
makers towards the end of the late 1990s, in a political economy that wedded market economy 
and growth policies with environmental concerns. The authors observe that “This in turn lent 
impetus (through a mixture of incentives, coercion, and emulation) to the ongoing reframing of 
environmental policy at the national and local level, around the world, via key mediating 
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World 
Bank Group, and the United Nations agencies” (16-17). 
     As knowledge producers and mediators, these multilateral organizations have been delegated 
to think on behalf of governments, purportedly, in the case of the IMF, to encourage international 
economic cooperation and sound fiscal practice according to Neoliberal principles: The IMF 
reasons and prescribes a general need in all economies for the “greater involvement of the 
private sector in the provision of public services (through the outsourcing of noncore functions, 
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public-private partnerships, concessions, and so forth).”  Their rational is that “these functions in 
certain areas can be provided more efficiently by the private sector (United Kingdom, 1994)” 
(IMF 2014, 50). This is an ongoing script. 
     And yet in making efficiency claims for the private sector, the IMF contradicts its own 
research and that of the World Bank.  An IMF policy paper (2004) and a global review by the 
World Bank (2005) found there was no real efficiency differences between the public and private 
sectors (Lobina 2014, 10). While more recent studies have found that in Water Services at least 
there is no conclusive evidence that privatization provides greater efficiency. Bayliss (2014) 
reports, from Bel and Warner (2008) that meta-analysis of all published studies on water 
distribution found no empirical support for cost-savings associated with privatization. The 
studies that do find a positive association with privatization often neglect to analyze, for instance, 
the source of profits which other studies have shown arise as the result of job cuts (297). 
     Proponents of privatization had argued the failure during the decade of International Water 
and Sanitation (1981-1991) of governments and aid agencies to achieve universal water supply.   
Bakker (2007) recalls how, following the Kyoto World Water Forum in 2003, proponents of 
private sector water management even began advocating water as a human right with the claim 
they could deliver where governments had failed and the World Bank then began subsidizing 
transnationals to provide Water Services in needy areas (437). Since then, long term private 
water investment in poorer regions has generally dwindled as water transnationals have followed 
the markets to greener pastures (Bayliss 2014, 254). And the corporate discourse has more 
profitably shifted to a new emphasis on sustainability and integrated services spanning water, 
waste and energy goods and services, involving shorter interventions rather than less lucrative 
long-term managerial concessions (Veolia 2014 Annual and Sustainability Report).   
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     The IMF and UNEP have supported this new corporate trend by increasingly urging 
governments to invest in their infrastructures via outsourcing paid for by public and private 
investment (UNEP 2011, 602). The stated intention of the IMF (2014) is to reduce the pressure 
on the public purse while avoiding “a depletion of public capital stocks [public infrastructure] 
and potentially adverse effects on long-term growth, particularly when private sector investment 
is also on the decline” (22).  The rational here being that the marketization of states’ capital 
assets should inject revenue into the private sector, stimulating job creation and overall economic 
growth.  Rather than expanding public sectors, this appears policy prescription appears to 
promote increasing outsourcing: UNEP understands that, “As water infrastructure is very capital-
intensive, private sector investment or support for public investment via bonds financed by 
investors is increasingly important. Private financing for infrastructure to produce freshwater is 
one area of potential significance for a Green Economy” (UNEP 2011, 602).  With the new 
pricing calculation, private financing for public infrastructure, and outsourcing to private firms 
appears to be a recipe for galvanizing financial markets.    
     From the point of view of this network analysis, such private relations induce a reality in 
which investors increase their access and influence over local water.  Lander laments how 
“Policies destined to defend the planet will be limited by the need to respect the sacred rights of 
the free market […] It is therefore not a matter of questioning the fact that the fundamental 
decisions in society are made by “the market”, but of expanding the market’s sphere of 
information and action to explicitly incorporate nature into its logic of values” (Lander 2011, 8). 
Investor/water relations are explored further in the following section. 
     The IMF and the UN Neoliberal performance of economic water scarcity positions the private 
sector in a key role explained by the Global Policy Forum, “The embrace of a voluntary 
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“partnership” approach has resulted in a corresponding shift towards a multi-stakeholder 
governance paradigm – buoyed by big business and the governments invested in it – in the World 
Economic Forum, the World Trade Organization, and the agencies and agendas of the UN” 
(Corporate Influence, Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org/corporate-influence.html). 
     In the wake of the 2015 Millennium Goals, the powerful TNCs of the private sector are 
angling to make themselves indispensable players within the UN’s post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda. This “multi-stakeholder governance paradigm” is a script repeatedly being 
performed at every level of government water discourse: in Canada, Quebec and Montreal, as 
described in Chapter Three. 
Hinterlands of Financialization in Montreal’s Public Water 
     Debt leveraging is one of the common ways governments raise the capital they need for 
strategic procurement, both directly as loans from private financial institutions and also in the 
form of legal contracts called bonds and other similar financial instruments that are monetized by 
institutional creditors or various financial institutions. Montreal’s high debt-leveraging for water 
infrastructure renewal is raising the capital required to procure large contracts that TNCs can 
accommodate at a cost advantage called economies of scale. These practices are increasing the 
exposure of Montreal Water Services to the financial markets with effects described in Chapter 
Three. 
     Financialization of procurement also references the financial type culture and its prescriptions 
that perform when municipalities increase their exposure to private finance and creditors. What 
are some of the key dynamics and relations of this exposure?  In what follows, I explore such 
relations by drawing upon existing analysis in financialization literature, textual presentation in 
newspaper exposes and financial coverage, market tracking websites, supranational and 
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government policy documents as well as water industry websites. In the process of this 
exploration, I trace the scripts translating these common financial practices into the Network for 
Neoliberal water-related procurement and its materializing realities. 
      The financial markets have grown and now starkly contrast the 30 years following World War 
II, during which certain practices restricted their growth: the costs of post-war reconstruction, 
unusually low asset prices helped by trade restrictions, nationalized banks that limited credit and 
debt levels in the public domain.  However, matters changed in the 1980s–90s with policies and 
practices, including new technologies, that saw financial markets globalizing, banks privatizing 
and creating new financial instruments for the markets and increasing availability of credit and 
subsequent rising debt levels (Piketty 2013, 461; Bowman et al 2012, 20). Over this period, the 
outsourcing of services provided profitable commodities which provided the underlying assets 
for the financial instruments to be traded on the financial markets and also increased profits for 
further capital investment.  These practices fueled the rise of finance. 
     Market volatility has increased as investors speculate in a manner less concerned with 
fundamentals of demand and supply and more swayed by price signals indicating the point-value 
of stock and political events (Bowman et al 2012, 2). This has led to sudden surges and dramatic 
drops in stock prices, an effect known as bubbles, effectively destabilizing the markets and 
challenging the concept of ‘true value’ (Hudson 2012, 125). Market dynamics have also 
contributed to stifling the growth of economy: By the end of the 2008 bubble, the massive 
growth of the financial sector accounted for nearly half of all corporate profits, diverting 
investment away from the production of goods, services and labour and towards short term gains 
in the capital markets (Quiggin 2009, 241).   
    Market volatility also sent large institutional investors in search of safer investments which 
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has contributed to the rise of bond markets in infrastructures including that of water.  Investors 
have been increasingly attracted to the monopoly nature of water infrastructure and its reliable 
revenue streams in the form of household user fees (Christopherson et al 2013, 354). 
     Infrastructure, as a market category, needs to not only attract investors, but to also compete 
with other investment options and therefore encourage investors’ confidence that the investment 
will prove low-risk and deliver a reasonable rate of return relative to other options.  Bresnihan 
(2015) following EC Harris (2013) indicates, “This means that the infrastructure project itself 
must be translated into the legible terms of financial investors - in terms of efficiency, strong and 
transparent management, and regulatory compliance” (2). This is to say that the investor and the 
investment must be made compatible and speak to each other in the same financial language, 
expressing similar financial values. To this end, inscriptions of efficiency and transparency 
combine and perform with others such as user-pay, full cost recovery and conservation 
imperatives to enlist and translate household water users into revenue streams and further 
materialize a culture that valorizes water-related infrastructure, first and foremost, monetarily, 
rather than socially. 
     Applying ANT’s material semiotics, I suggest that finance can be said to function as an 
immutable mobile, producing scripts that extend, perform and reproduce the power of finance 
and its networks. Owing to such practices and their relations, Christopherson et al (2013) reports 
“The financialised utility thus shifts value from the citizen consumer to the investor” (354). In 
Montreal we can anticipate increasing water revenues and debt transforming into increased 
outsourcing and market returns for investors. The authors indicate how finance has moved from a 
secondary, assisting role within government and economy to a defining one: “Financial 
rationales and practices have re-shaped performance metrics not just for enterprises across all 
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sectors of the economy but also throughout the public sector and utilities, including health 
services and social services, thereby directly affecting the social well-being and welfare of 
households” (351-352; Bowman and Ertürk 2012, 6). 
     Lapavitsas (2013) observes that “There is no standard form of financialization, even though 
there is commonality of underlying tendencies” (375). He notes that “comparative study of 
advanced countries has demonstrated the presence of financialization in general but has also 
revealed variations arising from institutional, historical and political factors (Lapavitsas 2013, 
375). 
     Private Water Services’ delivery can be procured to varying degrees: water authorities can 
outsource composite services, or outsource management via public private partnership 
concessions or sell rights to private equity firms or private utility companies. All are forms of 
privatization, of varying degrees, and all generate supply chains of commodities that can form 
the underlying assets from which tradable assets for speculation in the water-related markets are 
derived in the form of financial instruments (Tsing 2009, 149). Bayliss and Fine (2008) have 
observed that “though commercialization makes progress towards efficiency goals more easily 
identifiable […] institutional restructuring along these lines facilitates private sector involvement 
at a later date” (Bayliss 2014, 295).  Moreover, all forms of water privatization can lead to 
financialization since privatization readily generates capital required for that aspect of 
financialization that is speculation (Bayliss 2014, 295). 
     The Guardian (10/11/2012) reporting on the UKs private water utilities observed that “The 
level of debt is the thread that ties incompetence, negligence, tax avoidance and over charging 
together.”xiv Debt leveraging allows firms to pay their shareholders high dividends without 
raising equity (issuing stock). In this way shareholders can make a profit without the need to 
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invest in, say, improving services, production, or employment conditions that would increase 
equity or real value within the firm.  It also allows firms to avoid paying tax because whereas 
raising profits on equity (by issuing stock) is taxable, the interest payments on debt can be 
charged against tax. Debt leveraging also encourages overcharging of rates to raise the revenue 
to pay off accumulated debt and interest. 
     In 2014 Lazonick (2014) could report that corporations had used 54% of earnings to buy back 
their own stock and 37% to pay dividends leaving only 9% of earnings for new investment.  Low 
interest rates have encouraged financialization by making borrowing cheap and debt leveraging 
easy for large corporations. Veolia, the largest water TNC saw profits of $387 million in the first 
half of 2015, its profit reported as tripling in 2015. Notably, its debt is 9.223 billion euros.xv 
     Extending private property rights to Water Services has also paved the way for transnational 
private equity firms and their practices designed to maximize profits by acquiring control of 
shares in a target company and subjecting it to a radical restructuring with the aim of selling it or 
floating it on the stock exchange. Some private equity firms have also been known to make a fast 
return on an acquired company by selling off the assets in a process otherwise known as asset-
stripping. The Guardian reports that transnational private equity firms own 75% of UK water. 
     Ordinarily, private equity firms, managing the likes of large public pension portfolios, have 
been choosing water related investments, advertised as safe and lucrative. Financialized 
investment culture nevertheless encourages precarious practices as seen in the UK private equity 
firm activities that have been as much as 80% debt financed leaving only 20% of shareholder 
investment, constituting high risk.xvi As Allen and Pryke (2013), following O’Neil (2009) have 
observed in the UK, financialization has taken household water from being “a rather dull, safe 
asset, with earnings to match that profile […] placing it into the risk-taking world of financial 
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calculation” (423). 
     Applying the material semiotics of this ANT analysis I highlight the relations between water 
practices including water scripts: physical and economic water scarcity scripts translate other 
practices transforming goods, services and other infrastructure into tradeable assets such as 
stocks, bonds and exchange traded funds (ETFs) for capital markets; in this process dubbed 
financialization such scripts also attract investors with the promise of growing demand.  In the 
last few years water-related markets have been growing in scope, scale and value.  In a period of 
otherwise slow growth, Veolia’s stock has climbed 23% in 2015 and Suez 13%.xvii The online 
investors’ encyclopedia, Investopedia, expects to see “a host of new investments that provide 
exposure to this precious commodity and to the firms that deliver it to the marketplace.”xviii 
     Exchange-traded funds (ETFs), as an example, invest in companies operating in industries 
such as water treatment and purification, water utilities, water monitoring, and retail companies. 
Where there are stocks that can be united by an industry or theme, there soon will be exchange-
traded funds that try to capitalize on them (“Private equity ETFs aren’t fit for the public,” 
https://secure.marketwatch.com/story/private-equity-etfs-arent-fit-for-the-public-2013-05-06).  
Kaufman reports that “There are more than 100 indices [ETFs] that track and measure the value 
of stocks of companies in water-related businesses, such as utilities, sewage treatment and 
desalination. Several offer healthy returns” (Kaufman 2012).  In 2010 Geneva-based Pictet & Cie 
ran the biggest and oldest water fund, with €2.38bn under management.xix Its portfolio, which is 
invested in water-related stocks around the world, has gained 60.51% in 5 years.xx   
     In 2002 Barlow and Clarke warned in their book Blue Gold that “The more that water and 
Water Services become profitable commodities to be bought and sold in global markets, the more 
water becomes the target of foreign speculators in financial markets.  And given the increasing 
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scarcity of available fresh water supplies, the price of water could skyrocket as a result of 
investors speculating on commodity markets” (Barlow and Clarke 2002, 92). As Barlow and 
Clarke predicted, new financial instruments and practices along with escalating economic 
scarcity and demand are realizing the conditions in which the price of drinking water is rising to 
previously unseen levels.  While the dearth of independent analysis evaluating the effects of the 
markets on local water pricing indicates that more dedicated research needs to be done, there are 
signs that the price of water is likely affected by market dynamics.   
     The website, Circle of Blue generates, compiles and benchmarks water rates across the US. 
Circle of Blue reports a 40% rise in rates since 2010 and a 6% rise in 2015, well above inflation. 
Circle of Blue is funded in part by Value Web, a market environmentalism consultancy group for 
“multiple-sector/multi-stakeholder collaboration”.xxi xxii Externalized by Circle of Blue is any 
relationship between the rising cost of water bills and increasing returns from water-related 
shares and derivatives on the commodity and financial markets. Also entirely externalized is the 
impact on low income households having to pay such high marketized rates. 
     The 2013 Guardian Money, on the other hand, featured an exposé on the UK’s private water 
industry that provided a graphic showing the rising share value of water equity firms correlating 
with the rising rate of bills. It also described how by 2013, UK citizens had seen water bills rise 
to over $800.00 a year, an 82% rise over the previous decade, far in excess of inflation and in 
some areas doubling profits in the same period, often with million dollar bonuses and perks to 
executives, frequent sewage spills and 30% leakage rates per year.xxiii   
     More generally, the financialization of non-financial Public Service Industry likely has 
encouraged a well-documented deterioration in the quality of service provision, labour 
conditions and over all accountability. For instance, the two largest water transnationals, Veolia 
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and Suez and their subsidiaries have been responsible for poor management of water and waste 
water concessions, political lobbying, price-fixing, tax evasion, and fraud (Lobina 2014).    
     Law and Williams (2014) deem the “trader mentality” within the Public Service Industry as 
responsible for faster company turnovers of ownership and in the UK the overall creation of a 
“para-state of mainly private profit-seeking firms and an attendant huge growth of publicly 
funded private employment” (10-11).  Bayliss (2014) explains, “Financialization has meant that 
the ownership of firms increasingly rests with financial investors […] Pressure to pay dividends 
provides incentives for managers to cut wages, engage in fraud and deception, and to move into 
financial operations (Crotty 2005, cited in Epstein 2005)” (294-295). 
     Lapavitsas (2013) observes how workers too have become financialized “by incurring debt to 
meet essential needs, such as health and rising utility bills” (375). One in five Britons reportedly 
struggle to pay their water bills in part because bills outflank inflation and wage rises. On the 
other hand, where there’s little public funding for infrastructure and/or the prospect of low return 
for investors, communities are driven into debt financing from private institutions, or are simply 
left with ongoing scarcity.  A case in point is that of First Nation communities in Canada, who 
are 90% more likely than other Canadians to live without water on tap and adequate sanitation in 
their homes (Barlow 2015, 10; CUPE 2015).  This is a case of both institutional and economic 
scarcity in one of the world’s wealthiest states. 
     In a keynote address in 2015, the IMF president Christine Lagarde acknowledged that “the 
benefits of higher income are trickling up, not down,” and associated this trend of rising 
inequalities with financial deepening.  She recommended checking tax evasion and “reducing or 
removing tax relief on capital gains, stock options, and the profits of private equity investments 
funds” (Lagarde, Christine 2015). The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in its 
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report of (2011) also alluded to the damage done by financial markets, stating, “It is clear that 
across banking, investment and insurance – the core activities of the world’s financial system – 
significant changes in the philosophy, culture, strategy and approach, notably the overwhelming 
dominance of “short-termism”, will be required if capital and finance are to be reallocated to 
accelerate the emergence of a Green Economy (UNEP 2011, 623). 
     Despite these admitted problems with the markets and the presence therefore of value 
distortions, both UNEP and the IMF remain strong proponents of the Green Economy and its 
commodification and marketization of resources and claim that this and the new breed of trade 
agreement are corner stones to Green processes. UNEP maintains that to be green, an economy 
must not only be efficient, but also fair: “Fairness implies recognising global and country level 
equity dimensions, particularly in assuring a just transition to an economy that is low-carbon, 
resource efficient, and socially inclusive” (UNEP 2011, 24). Equity here is translated as equal 
access to markets whereby the markets must be allowed to grow unimpeded, without local 
barriers. Multilateral trade agreements must be observed to the letter, in other words. The 
principle of equity, in its translation as non-discrimination of access between nations, must be 
enforced, with no local favoritism. 
     Following Harvey (2003, 71) the problem of wealth concentration and inequality between 
nations and via monopolies and oligopolies is externalized. As to the excesses of the financial 
markets, in the IMF understanding, no “one size fits all”. So it seems that for finance, unlike 
trade, a multilateral approach to solving this problem is not recommended, and it is down to 
individual nations to introduce policies that address domestic inequalities (Lagarde 2015). A 
view that appears to externalize the globalized power of finance that is only likely to be 
enhanced by forthcoming trade agreements and their corporate tribunals for instance. 
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     The limitations of the market environmentalism framing seem stark when water scarcity 
statistics are considered: The UN’s Water for Life web page reports that “Around 1.2 billion 
people, or almost one-fifth of the world's population, live in areas of physical scarcity, and 500 
million people are approaching this situation. Another 1.6 billion people, or almost one quarter of 
the world's population, face economic water shortage” (UN 2015).  The World Health 
Organization (WHO 2014) reports that an estimated 842,000 deaths a year occur on account of 
unsafe water supply, and related poor sanitation and hygiene. The most entrenched economic 
scarcity largely occurs in the global south, and is growing (UN 2015, 8). 
     This data shows that the financial practices assembled and translated by the Network suggest 
that one effect of water scarcity scripts, in combination with the ‘true value’ script, is that the 
thirst for profit has not efficiently distributed clean water, water infrastructure and water oriented 
institutions equitably a) to the growing number of communities that cannot do without it b) at a 
price all can necessarily afford and c) in ways that encourage local democratic influence over 
water production and water access for local humans and non-humans (Shiva 2005; Swyndegouw 
2005; Bakker 2007; Bayliss 2014). 
     In response to growing dissatisfaction with the commodification of their Water Services, an 
accelerating rate of municipalities within their network relations have either bought their way out 
of concession contracts or simply refused to renew them and have returned to varying degrees of 
public delivery: 235 in 37 countries from 2000 to 2015 (Kishimoto, Petitjean and Lobina 2015, 
6-10).  Montreal, on the other hand, in the grip of a Network for the globalization and 
financialization of its water-related procurement, is in the process of adopting practices that 
further entrench commodification of water production. While local governments in Europe are 
reportedly responding to local pressure to increasingly consolidate their Water Services, calling 
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for more public investment to create social and economic development, and keep it locally 
oriented, Montrealers are being steadily separated from their local water. Local materialities 
colouring Montreal water in a more deeply Neoliberal vein are the subject of the following 
chapter.   
      Chapters Three describes the Network’s particular local and emergent translations of the four 
devices described above within Montreal’ water infrastructure procurement.  The growth of 
financializing and globalizing culture in all levels of government is shown as it increasingly 
opens water production and all its infrastructure up to private actors/practices, and asset creation 
for market exchange. In this vein the Chapter takes in Montreal’s adoption of new procurement 
practices, including the new water pricing calculation, facilitating the trajectory of Montreal 
water production towards a fully regressive, market friendly tariffication that is intended to 
reflect the full cost of all water infrastructure and large debt servicing to private financial 
institutions.  I show how this emergent reality signifies the demise of Water Services managed as 
a more progressive, governmental property tax-based revenue system and, in view of other 
emerging relations, also suggests the possible full corporatization of Montreal Water Services 
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     Chapter Two describes how water-related infrastructure procurement is facilitating what 
Harvey, following Marx, has described generally as an ‘accumulation by dispossession’, an 
appropriation of the Commons by private interests for capitalist development (Harvey 2003, 74-
75). The fact that Neoliberal water production is often managed by the public sector can make its 
material relations less visible. In order to apprehend such processes at the local level, therefore, 
the relations that materialize globalized and financialized water-related infrastructure also need 
to be situated within their local particularities and the local logics commodifying local water 
production. Using ANT, this involves tracing the translation and mediation of practices, 
including values, that relate to and perform local water-related procurement via strategies that are 
legal, financial, economic, environmental, social and cultural. 
      The method used in this thesis, as noted in Chapter One, is to present key mediations by the 
Network translating globalized, financialized water-related procurement into Montreal via the 
introduction of practices including private market-oriented values externalizing public values.  
The data and practices drawn upon here include supranational, federal, provincial and municipal 
government texts performing water-related infrastructure procurement policy from economic, 
environmental, international trade and financial points of view. The data gathered shows that the 
Network in Montreal has also translated laws, political texts, think tank texts, conservation texts, 
mainstream media texts, as well as water policy literature in its water-related procurement. 
     Following Harvey, Neoliberal water processes are predicated upon access of the private sector 
to public water production and its infrastructure. With that extension, via legal contract, a process 
of commodification may take place, in which the good or service is given an economic value 
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permitting its market exhange (Harvey 2005, 165). It is worth recapping here from Chapter Two 
that only standardized goods, services and infrastructure can be commodified, and only 
commodified goods, services and infrastructure can be traded as assets on the financial markets 
(Huws 2011, 64). The procurement of public services requires that “use value is thereby 
transformed into exchange value” (Huws 2011, 64). 
     The four new procurement devices of globalized compulsory competitive tendering (GCCT), 
economies of scale, a new pricing calculation and large debt leveraging and their relations, 
facilitate the extension of private property rights into Montreal water and the conversion of the 
use value of public water infrastructure into exchange value. This chapter describes these devices 
and their relations within Montreal’s procurement network that is extending private/ market 
access into its water-related infrastructure via practices of law making, policy making, decision 
making, knowledge production and service delivery. 
Three Governments Extending the Private into Montreal Water Production 
     Canada, Quebec and Montreal are three of the actors within the network materializing the 
globalization and financialization of Water Services via the new procurement in Montreal and all 
three have extended private property rights within their jurisdictions. In Canada, unlike most 
OECD countries, powers relevant to water management are largely devolved to sub-federal 
levels of jurisdiction (Paehlke, 2001). Canadian provinces are constitutionally recognized as the 
resource owners and the municipalities are ultimately responsible for water services, production 
and delivery (Hill et al 2008, 317).   
     Municipalities now have 60% of Canada’s infrastructure within their jurisdiction but only 8 
cents of every income tax dollar going to municipalities and the 92 cents remainder going to 
federal, provincial and territorial governments. xxiv Of the revenue municipalities have access to 
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i.e. property tax, federal, provincial transfers and user fees, only over the latter do they have sole 
control (Kitchen 1996; Furlong and Bakker 2010b, 352). The Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities (FCM) have complained that despite a $123 billion infrastructure deficit only 9 
billion over 10 years is being allotted.xxv 
     While there is plenty of evidence that municipalities in Canada have limited means of revenue 
generation, such a revenue focus on municipal management can absent the transformative power 
of public procurement: Chapter Two noted how it represented 15-20% of GDP in OECD 
countries (Thai and Grimm 2000, 231; Joint EU-Canada Scoping Exercise March 5 2009, 7; 
Shrybman 2010). As such procurement by all levels of government in Canada can be considered 
as a form of capital investment, increasingly, under Neoliberalism’s Public Management scripts, 
committed to growing the public service industry rather than growing the public sector.  In this 
regard it performs a key role in the redistribution of wealth and power from the public to the 
private.     
     The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) echoes the IMF (2015), maintaining that 
“Improving our roads, bridges, and water systems is one of the best ways to create local jobs and 
generate $1.20 in annual GDP growth for each dollar invested” (FCM 2015, 4).  Its growth plan 
is predicated upon massive infrastructural development (FCM 2015, 5). This plan however 
externalizes important questions and materialities: Where will investment capital come from? 
How will it be invested? What actors will be enrolled into the procurement network and 
empowered by tax-payers money? Who will decide? 
     In Canada Neoliberal procurement strategies have seen the rise of para-governmental, 
corporate oriented organizations, introducing private decision-making into water, under the new 
designation of governance (Swyngedouw 2005b, 1991). At all levels of government, 
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Neoliberalism’s policy orientation of New Public Management has scripted and performed 
various degrees of managerial delegation of responsibility to private or non-public actors in a 
shift from ‘government to governance’ of services. This shift has often been framed as “a natural 
and necessary response to ‘globalization’ that provides governments with the capacity necessary 
to improve efficiency, innovation and performance, while reducing the putatively negative 
effects of civil service management structures” (Furlong and Bakker 2010b, 350).      
     Restricted and restrictive federal funding strategies have only encouraged the municipal turn 
to private actors. In 2009, PPP Canada Inc. was created as a Crown corporation, with an 
independent Board of Directors largely taken from the private sector, reporting through the 
Minister of Finance to Parliament (PPP Canada, About Us). PPP makes federal funding for 
projects over 100 million, conditional upon its Public Private Partnership (P3) screen and 
proposes entering into a creditor/debtor relationship with consortiums that include private 
companies and private financial institutions that instigate private loans and activities such as 
management, operation, maintenance and/or ownership of facilities previously performed by the 
public sector. The municipality makes regular payments to the consortium to cover financing, 
operating and maintenance costs, in addition to profits. Private sector returns on investment are 
often as much or more than 15-20% (Loxley 2012, 5). 
     As such, PPP presents another modality of procurement privatizing, and financializing of the 
commons in a Neoliberal translation of primitive accumulation. For the FCM, that “the decision 
of PPP will be considered final and binding […] is a concerning change in policy. Local 
governments are the experts on the infrastructure needs and capacities of their communities and 
removing this decision from locally elected officials will potentially distort local priorities.” xxvi 
     In Quebec La Stratégie gouvernementale de développement durable 2015-2020 : La 
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Participation de la Société  formally introduces P3s as important partners of government.xxvii 
However P3s had already become a policy option for utilities in 2005 with article 108 of Law 
134 stipulating « Toute municipalité locale peut, pour une durée maximale de 25 ans, confier à 
une personne l’exploitation de son système d’aqueduc ou d’égout ou de ses autres ouvrages 
d’alimentation en eau ou d’assainissement des eaux» xxviii The Politique national de l’eau of 
2002 had set the tone, introducing the script « gouvernance publique » that effectively made 
space for private management within a public service (71).xxix 
     The following year 2003 saw the creation of the knowledge and innovation Public Private 
Partnership hub CREDEAU, jointly funded by governments, universities and corporate 
subsidiaries of Veolia and Suez: that evolved from a collaboration between Polytechnic of 
Montreal, Mcgill University and the private college Ecole de Technologie Superior. On the one 
hand CREDEAU operates in the public interest, «Participer à l’amélioration du bien-être des 
Canadiens par la diffusion des connaissances scientifiques. » And on the other hand it operates in 
the private interest, « Augmenter le potentiel d’innovation de l’industrie canadienne du 
traitement et de la distribution des eaux. » xxx 
     In Equipe Coderre’s online platform (2013), mention of Montreal’s expertise in water 
management is associated with this public private partnership of knowledge production in terms 
that suggest a development pact, “Montréal peut déjà compter sur une solide expertise en 
technologie de l’eau avec, entre autres, le Centre de recherche, développement et validation des 
technologies et procédés en traitement des eaux (CREDEAU). Il faut maintenant aller plus loin 
et créer un secteur d’activité stratégique innovant pour devenir chef de file mondial” (Equipe 
Coderre). 
     Swyngedouw (2005) has observed that one unanticipated effect of the increasing 
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marketization of water is the limiting of public access to knowledge within the sector.  
“Information that was once in the public domain becomes commodified, takes on commercial 
significance, and is often treated as confidential” (90). Certainly it is the case that access to 
research within CREDEAU is by authorization only (CREDEAU). Montreal has entered into 32 
contracts with the member of CREDEAU, the Corporation de Polytechnique de Montreal since 
2012 and has procured a five-year research agreement as of 2016.xxxi 
     This research points to how CREDEAU joins Canada, Quebec and the City of Montreal to the 
world’s largest transnational water corporations in a collaborative endeavor to transform public 
water into private asset(s) via innovations and their standardizations in a relationship that can 
become conflicted where public service values and the public interest is concerned, as described 
more fully further along. This kind of relationship is also one that feeds globalized compulsory 
competitive tendering if CREDEAU is understood as a hothouse for those technologies that are 
to be commodified into goods, services, infrastructure that can then be procured by Montreal and 
other governments around the globe. 
     The provincial Water Management policy is presently wedded to the global marketization of 
water goods and services and signposts its support for growing the presence of Quebec’s private 
environmental sector on the international markets, « d’accroître la part des entreprises 
québécoises du secteur environnemental sur le marché international. »xxxii As Hebert et al (2013) 
note,  outsourcing in Quebec and Montreal is translated by the establishment not only as cost 
reduction and more efficient management but also as job creation in the private sector (17). 
Montreal’s New Economic Paradigm 
     A week or so after the new Mayor Denis Coderre’s election to municipal office in 2013 he 
attends a conference organized by Montreal’s Chamber of Commerce welcoming then Prime 
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Minister Stephen Harper to mark the conclusion of the CETA trade negotiations. At the gathering 
Harper noted how “dans les récentes negotiations avec l`Europe, le Québec et les Québecois et 
en particulier Montréal […] ont joué un rôle crucial.” xxxiii CETA introduces the likely prospect 
of a new single procurement market with the EU, representing, arguably, a significant extension 
of private property rights into Montreal’s Water Services and infrastructure.          
     This emphasis on global markets was first formalized in 2011, under the previous 
administration, with the introduction of Montreal’s Development Strategy 2011-2017, featuring 
its new economic paradigm:   
 
(Montreal’s Economic Development Strategy 2011-2017: Economic Context, http://www.sdemontreal 
.com/en/strategic-framework/economic-context) 
     This thesis finds that the emerging network for Montreal water production and infrastructure’s 
globalization and financialization clearly fits neatly into this economic paradigm: Notably, actual 
mention of privatization is avoided within this, as in other establishment texts, but rather 
concepts of Green and Digital Economies and global networks are used. Also apparent in the 
new paradigm, is the shift away from Montreal as job provider, towards Montreal as procurer. 
This transition that did not happen overnight, as seen in the case of the City’s water production. 
     During the 1970s Audette-Chapdelaine (2016) finds that, “blue-collar workers were experts in 
inspection and repair and a certain prestige was even associated with the employees of the 
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Aqueduct Service” (8). Montreal’s private policy turn and the systemic neglect of its water 
infrastructure services dates to 1979, with an administrative restructuring that reduced the 
amount of expertise, the number of specialized teams and the number of overall municipal 
employees and that persisted throughout the 80s and 90s. When in 2001 Montreal finally decided 
to address growing water infrastructure problems it turned to outside firms for the financial, 
technical, organizational and engineering expertise it needed. The City relied upon the financial, 
technical and organizational services of engineering consultants, hired to perform feasibility 
studies, arrange work schedules, prepare tenders for contractors and supervise works (21). 
     The Water Service actually built up its workforce between 2009 and 2012 to initiate the plan 
to upgrade the system of water infrastructure (Audette-Chapdelaine 2016, 9).  However the City 
has slated 2,200 public sector jobs to go between 2014-2018. xxxivIt’s not for the public record as 
to how many public sector jobs are to leave the Water Service. But in 2015, public service 
workers and their unions across Quebec formed Le Front Commun to oppose austerity cuts to 
jobs and conditions. The City’s municipal workers at the negotiating table have reported the 
following: « L’ensemble des contribuables devrait être inquiet de ce que nous entendons à la 
table de négociation. L’administration veut carrément démanteler l’ensemble des services 
publics municipaux et remettre une grande partie des travaux à des firmes privées. xxxv 
     The new paradigm and its global procurement is contributing to labour flexibilization 
associated with the deterioration in unionization, income and conditions, further compromising 
the bargaining power of lower-income workers (Brennan 2012, 4; IMF 2015, 26). It has also 
been facilitated by Quebec legislation increasing labour flexibilization: the 2004 amendment of 
article 45 of the Province’s Code de Travail meant in practice that employers were no longer 
obliged to observe the transfer of union accreditations or collective agreements when outsourcing 
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services (Hebert et al 2013, 16).   
     What is apparent is that outsourcing to the private sector has dramatically increased.  And in 
2015, Montreal’s Gazette newspaper reports the observation made by the municipal opposition 
party that “Cuts to city staff combined with an increase in infrastructure contracts means the City 
will have to farm out more work to the private sector.” xxxviEquipe Coderre has been nothing if 
not enthusiastic about outsourcing: Not only did the Water Services budget of 2015 plan a 50 % 
increase in investments from $147 to $220 million but, significantly, a 79% increase in awarded 
contracts from $176 to $313 million (5).xxxvii 
     According to the City webpage “Vue sur les contrats”, Montreal Water Services have tendered 
6658 water-related contracts since 2012 and 2467 from 2015-2016.xxxviiiIn the current state of 
affairs, 2015-2017 Three Year Investment Plan (PTI) with its total investment of 4 562 M$ for 
that period will largely target outsourced contracts.xxxix 
     And how does the practice of Globalized Compulsory Competitive Tendering (GCCT) 
contribute to this state of affairs and further extend private relations into Montreal water-related 
infrastructure?  Within Montreal’s procurement policy of 2015, “The City considers the use of 
framework agreements as a privileged tool allowing each business unit [public service] to benefit 
from consolidation savings and act cohesively in its business relations with the market.” xl And 
Montreal supports the new breed of trade accords, under the terms of which, critics have warned, 
once goods and services are procured, it would likely prove very costly to re-municipalize, given 
the risk of corporate power successfully challenging policy changes that threaten their 
investments. From a privatization perspective, the terms of CETA and TISA would thus have a 
ratchet effect on current outsourcing (Eberhardt et al 2014). 
     Between high infrastructural investments, outsourcing, and the terms of new up and coming 
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trade agreements, the degree to which GCCT could contribute to the standardization, 
globalization and overall marketization of Montreal water-related services appears to be great. 
Standardizing and financializing relations described further along reveal an ongoing strategy for 
developing this potential to the advantage of corporations and larger water related companies. 
Neoliberal Procurement and Montreal’s Restructuring for Economies of Scale 
     An important precondition for outsourcing is the standardization of tasks, allowing their 
accurate measurement according to performance indicators (Huws 2012, 3). The Conference 
Board of Canada, on behalf of the Standards Council of Canada, carried out a study of the impact 
of standardization on the Canadian Economy.  The “many benefits of standards” highlighted in 
the report included the facilitation of economies of scale, international trade and labour 
productivity.xli 
     Standards play an increasingly important role in the development of specifications for 
service-level agreements (SLAs) and remote management, by setting down protocols and 
expectations for all the processes involved, which allows a specific performance to be repeated 
over and over again across space and time. In 2010 alone, the International Standardization 
Organization (ISO) published 1,313 new standards and had a further 1,900 new standards under 
development (Huws 2012, 4).   
     Within procurement, standardization is teamed with the script of marginal costing, that 
calculates the extra cost of producing one more unit, a practice that encourages contracting for 
economies of scale, as a cost saving strategy. I find this script turns up in the City of Montreal in 
a budget communique from 2015, “Rechercher, coûte que coûte, la performance par de 
meilleures pratiques et de meilleures économies d’échelle (2).”xlii Huws (2011) has found 
generally that administrators working within this actuarial, fiancialized, financializing culture, 
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pressured into getting “the best value” dollars and cents mindset, are won over by the cheaper 
costs afforded by the public service industry’s economies of scale and buy from the cheapest 
suppliers, selling the most standardized goods or services (Huws 2011, 73).    
     I argue it follows that if Montreal water is being globalized and financialized via a new 
procurement then processes of standardization should be traceable within the municipal 
structuring and development of water production. How are standardization processes being 
materialized for global procurement of water-related infrastructure? The City calls for 
standardization and globalization of its purchases in no uncertain terms in its procurement policy 
from 2015: « les unités d’affaires recourent à des pratiques harmonisées afin d’optimiser l’usage 
des ressources ainsi que l’exécution performante des travaux. La normalisation des biens et 
services, la globalisation des achats, le développement d’approches novatrices […] comptent 
parmi les principaux moyens d’atteindre l’objectif recherché. » Of note here, in the procurement 
policy, is the translation of public services into « les unités d’affaires» i.e. business units and  
harmonization, practices that can be translated here as  a process of achieving regulatory 
efficiency, effectiveness and clarity through globalization and standardization.xliii 
     In a 2015 budget communique, the municipal government announced a more efficient funding 
model privileging economies of scale, « Rechercher, coûte que coûte, la performance par de 
meilleures pratiques et de meilleures économies d’échelle. »xliv To achieve economies of scale 
requires urban restructuring in the form of centralization and standardizations. 
     To this end the City has recently introduced a new integrated works program. The plan is for 
roads and water departments across 19 boroughs to coordinate their works using the digital 
Smart City initiative of improved communications, all of which is framed as introducing 
efficiencies. xlv 
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     A communique from the City in 2014 mentions the economies of scale available to them now 
thanks to the centralisation and standardization of all six water plants on the Island of Montreal, 
newly including two more under the central authority of the agglomeration, presided over by 
Mayor Coderre. The claim is made that this will allow for greater efficiencies at the point of 
supply and optimization of risk-management cohesion in emergency response. While 
standardization of investment management and economies of scale for operating expenses are 
also cited.xlvi 
     The City is clear that such large public works will be done “En coordination et concertation 
avec l'ensemble des partenaires et entreprises d'utilité publique.” xlvii Here the City seems to be 
referencing Quebec’s Environmental Network which includes many small, medium and large 
Quebec-based water related companies as well as corporations such as Veolia and Suez 
subsidiary Degremont. 
     The City is also likely referencing PEXEP (Program of excellence en eau potable),  a 
benchmarking organization that aims to encourage the voluntary adoption by Quebec’s 
municipalities of norms of a higher standard of drinking water production than those set by the 
Quebec government’s Règlement sur la qualité de l’eau potable. It is a project of the private 
American Water Works Association (AWWA) that sets standards across the US. The 
Environmental Network is the Quebec arm of AWWA.xlviii  Both have the full support of the 
Quebec government. xlix Those municipalities certified include the purification stations serving 
Montreal and 30 or so other cities. PEXEP serves more than half the population of Quebec.   
     Economies of scale is a key practice that indicates the degree to which the City has 
transformed via procurement: In 2009, Jacques Bergeron, the auditor general questioned the 
circumstances around the awarding of a water meter contract, commenting that there was no 
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reason why one firm should carry out the entire contract when it could be done by a number of 
smaller firms for less.l Since then the City has embraced economies of scale which are further 
encouraged by CETA’s procurement valuation rules that impose larger contracts (CCPA, Making 
Sense of CETA 2014, 26):  Article II.6 of CETA’s Valuation Rules bars municipalities from 
dividing up contracts into separate, smaller contracts with the purpose of escaping the CETA 
thresholds ($625,762 for procurement by utilities, $7.8 million for construction services).  While 
Article II.7 requires that recurring contracts are gathered into a single unit of tender to bring 
them within the CETA regulation.li 
     Likely, a new function of the auditor general will be ensuring that procurement tenders 
conform to the CETA strictures the federal government negotiated for GCCT with procurement 
terms that effectively encourage greater centralization for greater standardization and 
commodification of goods and services.  Critics have observed that the CETA thresholds at 
which procurement falls under the agreement will cover about “80% of the value of all 
government procurement in Ontario, notably large infrastructure projects where minimum local 
content rules would have most economic development impact.” For instance, under CETA no 
minimum local content such as local hires can be demanded, indeed no local preference shown 
as mentioned above (Making Sense of CETA 2014, 26-28).   
     The Equipe Coderre platform commits to using water economy to create jobs, but allegiance 
to CETA begs the question, “Jobs where and for whom?” The thresholds at which GCCT 
becomes mandatory may be low enough to support local and medium businesses, if the political 
will is there.  But that’s not Montreal’s mandate or obligation within the new economic 
paradigm, as seen above and described in more detail below. And as a case in point: Veolia has 
received 43 contracts since January 2012 and most of these have been smaller contracts, likely 
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owing to the fact that large corporations can always charge less for more thanks to economies of 
scope and scale and the power to produce to standards over space and time. lii 
     The Auditor General may well have once wanted contracts to be smaller and more widely 
sourced, however economies of scale and standardizations are more likely in an increasingly, 
globalizing and financializing municipal procurement market. liii This is not, however, a position 
clearly stated by the Mayor, who has repeatedly indicated that transformations are not about 
centralization but harmonization and coherence, reportedly remarking that “It is a matter of 
attitude, it is not just a matter of structure. It’s not a matter of centralization versus 
decentralization. It is a matter of efficiency and coherence.”liv 
Green Economy’s New Pricing Calculation for Montreal   
     How does Montreal’s conservation orientation relate to economies of scale, their 
standardizations and the realization of Montreal water’s full market potential within the New 
Economic Paradigm of Green Economy?  I address this question by showing how the City shifts 
its focus from a conservation policy based on physical scarcity and consumption practices to an 
industrial one based on economic scarcity, in line with UNEP and IMF prescriptions seen in 
Chapter Two. 
     Caliskan and Callon (2010b) note, “It is important to recognize that the notion of [socio-
technical networks] is designed to encompass the emotional, corporal, textual and technical 
elements that contribute to the maintenance of markets” (Caliskan and Callon 2010b, 21). 
In Montreal water, it seems fair to say that the point at which water, emotions, industry and 
financial markets come together is that of conservation.   
      In recent years much has been made of Montrealers’ water over-consumption. In 2009 
Quebeckers reportedly consumed 706 litres and Ontarians 409 and the message widely 
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disseminated was that Quebec households wasted water. According to EauSecours! these figures 
were presented in such a way as to make householders seem responsible for excessive water 
usage by absenting Montreal’s water leakage rate which would locate the problem with public 
management rather than individual householders habits.lv However, more recently, echoing the 
UNEP and IMF prescriptions seen in Chapter Two for investment in infrastructure, the physical 
scarcity script has made way for the economic scarcity script that has seen a shift in emphasis 
from Quebeckers household water consumption habits to the problem of water production. 
     This turn focusses on the lamentable state of Montreal’s water infrastructure as a whole. A 
steady stream of articles in the main newspapers have performed the urgency of 1000 burst water 
mains per year, and the persistent loss of 30% of the City’s water through leakages, the 
equivalent of 200 Olympic sized swimming pools per day. lvi The provincial government has 
calculated the money to be saved from the planned economies within its Water Strategy, «Une 
réduction de 20 % de la consommation totale pourrait représenter des économies de l’ordre de 
deux milliards sur 20 ans.»lvii 
     Montreal’s Water Report 2014 shows that the Coderre administration is retaining la Stratégie 
montréalaise de l’eau 2011-2020 from the previous (discredited) government, and falling in line 
with Quebec’s Stratégie d’economie d’eau potable (SQEEP), which prioritizes the responsible 
management and optimization of water-related assets and their performance. lviiiThis is an 
orientation in which water is problematized and translated and performed as an economic 
scarcity that presents water infrastructure as valuable assets, and stresses water conservation as a 
problem of over-consumption and over production requiring infrastructural investment, and 
upgrades via Green marketization (Service de l’eau 2015, 14).   
     This thesis maintains that a physical scarcity orientation connects water to local actors and 
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their consumption habits using conservation data. But in an economic scarcity orientation, 
Montreal’s conservation public awareness campaign, described below, has also, effectively, been 
making visible the technologies and the commodities involved in water production. There are 
more than 50 web pages on the Ville de Montreal website dedicated to the various  relations of 
water production in the City: technologies, processes, regulations and so on. The sustainable 
water management home page assures visitors that «la Ville travaille à réduire son empreinte 
environnementale sur tout le cycle de l'eau: production,  distribution, épuration. C’est là un 
engagement ferme pour le bien-être des citoyens, au bénéfice des générations futures. » lix 
    The network teleology and trajectory is to commodify water production in a Green Economy, 
to disentangle it from local attachments and resistance in order to further facilitate the 
normalization of commodification processes described in Chapter Two. Neves et al (2012) have 
observed that “As a realm popularly perceived to be contesting the environmental excesses of 
capitalist logic, conservation is uniquely positioned to be reconstituted so as to (re)present 
neoliberalism’s larger message that economic growth and the protection of nature are essentially 
compatible projects” (16).  Conservation practices and their scripts have become important 
actors in the normalization of water commodification. 
     June 2015 saw the culmination of a large media and public awareness campaign that had been 
sensitizing Montrealers around efficient consumption practices from 2010, and that had, in its 
performance, also made visible the means of Montreal’s water production. This performance 
paved the way for the next step towards a Green economy: the introduction of an important new 
methodology for calculating the cost of Water Services: “le coût des services d’eau au m3 d’eau 
potable” i.e. the cost of services for every 1000 litres of water produced.  This new calculation 
now ties the volume of consumption to water production costs that now potentially include 
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operations, maintenance, and infrastructural upgrades, debt leveraging and debt servicing.lx  The 
City’s detailed announcement of a 22% drop in consumption failed to mention the new 
calculation for water production, already known to the administration and tucked away on the 
Ville de Montreal website in its Water Report 2014, published in July 2015. On page 9 the City 
explained that 93% of water costs go to pay for services i.e. maintenance, wages and upgrades of 
the system, while only 7% of costs actually reflect consumption patterns (Service de l’eau 2015, 
15, 9). 
     In fact, the argument made here is that the whole layout of the Water Report 2014, a report 
with its 16 pages of graphs, tables, and photos serves as a representation of the new pricing 
calculation or device, combining immutable mobiles of true value, efficiencies and full cost 
recovery (Service de l’eau 2015). Remembering that full cost recovery refers to the valuation and 
pricing of all aspects of production, suggest that the conservation campaign has also served to 
disentangle services in order to valorize them, facilitating their qualification as assets. 
     This new pricing calculation is arguably newsworthy since it signifies that the price 
Montrealers pay for their water will increasingly be determined not by corrupt officials and 
organized crime, or non-corrupt officials for that matter, but by market scripts and corporate 
relations. For to say that water will now be priced according to the full cost of production is to 
operationalize the policy of full cost recovery, introduced by the City in 2009.lxi 
     The crux of the argument being made here is that since so much of Montreal’s Water Services 
and infrastructure are outsourced to private firms and traded as assets on the capital markets, 
pricing Montreal water according to production costs also ties Montreal water infrastructure to 
the markets and the ‘true value’ i.e. market value script of Green economy (Service de l’eau 
2011, 8). Abiding by prescriptions of true value and full cost recovery, rising market prices can 
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now, hypothetically, justify large increases to the cost of water.  Since cost is no longer based on 
volume of falling consumption but the rising costs of infrastructural upgrade, the new pricing 
calculation connects the pricing of water production not only to the water service markets but 
likely soon to be a globalized compulsory competitive tendering for Water Services procurement. 
     The question arises here as to how the new water pricing calculation can relate to an industrial 
conservation.  By way of reply: PEXEP is there to adopt new standards, which invites the 
innovation required to, say, detect and remove the pollutants that industrial practices and 
chemistries introduce into water. PEXEP standards, widely adopted, can then materialize into 
economies of scale and large contracts for the PSI, realizing provincial and municipal ambitions 
to grow the water industry in Quebec and Montreal.lxii   And when the City outsources to Veolia 
to lay pipes the City’s new pricing calculation factors the cost of doing business with Veolia into 
the price of upgrades and maintenance. When pricing is pegged to production costs and policies 
of full cost recovery, and the markets, this is an invitation to a growing industry that there is a 
captive source of revenue: namely the 1, 9 million residential water users in the agglomeration of 
Montreal with its 26 500 industrial, commercial and institutional users and 9 196 km of water 
supply and sewage pipes. lxiii 
     Mentioned in Chapter Two is the 41% rise in water infrastructure costs in 30 US cities since 
2010, according to Circle of Blue, the water reporting and data sharing hub.lxiv Circle of Blue 
does not clarify what part of this is attributed to the increasing need for infrastructural upgrades 
compared to increasing share value of water related stocks. But here in Montreal Veolia and 
Suez, among many others, do water business and in 2015 the two TNCs saw their share values 
rise significantly: Veolia 23% and Suez 13% as noted in Chapter Two. This likely affected 
Montreal water when the price for the construction of Montreal’s new ozonification plant by 
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Suez subsidiary Degremont rose 40% relative to the 2005 estimate.lxv 
      If market environmentalism and its practices endeavour to perform an extension of property 
rights over all of nature, I argue that the new pricing calculation is a key device extending both 
private property rights and the markets into water to the degree that public water production and 
all of its considerable infrastructure is both turned into assets and outsourced or fully privatized.   
But isn’t Montreal water public water?  And doesn’t the City promise to «Assurer la maîtrise, la 
coordination et la cohérence des activités du cycle de l’eau, sous l’angle de l’entretien du réseau 
et de son développement, de manière à développer une organisation publique de l’eau 
performante et reconnue comme telle par la population ».lxvi 
     And doesn’t the City promise affordable water?  After all, in the finance policy, «Certains 
critères doivent tenir compte de la capacité de payer des citoyens et des citoyennes.» 
In a situation of increasing private involvement in water production the question begs as to who 
decides what affordable means. In the City’s policy, user fees for services can be based on 
comparative studies carried out « en collaboration avec des organismes publics ou privés » lxvii 
To more fully understand how the logic for commodifying water is being constructed in 
Montreal as a culture also involves tracing the insinuation of financialization practices, their 
scripts and values shaping the City’s water procurement. I do this with recourse to Quebec and 
Montreal water and financial policy documents, and those of their private knowledge producers.   
Finance Scripts Formatting Montreal Water Procurement 
     Chapter One introduced the term formatting to underline the activity and agency of practices 
and their relations, resulting in transactions and exchanges among things and agents, necessary 
for the creation of value. Importantly, to the degree that such formatting helps reproduce 
dominant situations it is also agentic to the representation of such situations as reality (Latour 
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and Callon 1997, 3). This is to say that it is performative. 
     Here, I analyze the Network in Montreal for signs of this formatting in the construction of the 
logic underpinning the commodification of water, visible in the insinuation, assembling and 
performance of powerful scripts, embedded in organizational policy institutional laws, 
regulations, technologies and knowledge production. How do these actors construct in relation to 
each other? Once again, for Callon (1998), economy cannot be understood without factoring in 
the economics required in the form of those formatting agencies that allow transactions to occur, 
e.g. marketing, accounting, calculations, money, policy and regulations, and their knowledge 
practices (30). How are financial and market-oriented scripts formatting Montreal water 
production infrastructure and its procurement practices in the City?   
     This thesis finds in the evidence discussed here is that at the point of municipalities, there is 
the rise in prominence of the finance officer and financial culture and its models and patterns of 
problem solving into new areas of government that were once non-financial: municipal 
departments materialize into municipal services, and department expenses become departmental 
charges, following best practices prescribed by the likes of the private General Finance Officers 
Association (GFOA) across Canada and the US.lxviii 
     As knowledge producers within this particular culture the GFOA and its Best Practices 
disseminate and reinforce financial scripts informing and harmonizing budgetary and 
procurement practices often encouraging the extension of private property rights into the public 
sector. The Quebec Minister of Municipalities (MAMOT) invites Quebec’s municipalities to 
employ GFOA best practices. lxixAnd both the Province and the municipality of Montreal 
reference it in budget related documents, « Les politiques respectent les principes développés par 
l’organisme [GFOA] lesquels sont mis de l’avant par le ministère des Affaires municipales et des 
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Régions (MAMR) du gouvernement du Québec.lxx 
     Roger Galipeau founded the Canadian section of GFOA in 2000 and has sat on the 
international administrative council of the GFOA.lxxi Notably, he has also advocated for 
privatization of water management in different capacities ever since he was Director of Finance 
for Montreal in 1995 (Lauzon 1997). Galipeau is also a key figure within the Center for 
Interuniversity Research and Analysis of Organizations (CIRANO). CIRANO is a non-profit 
provincially funded research group. Among its corporate partners are some of the largest banks 
and corporations in Canada, the Chamber of Commerce and the Government of Quebec.lxxii 
     Furlong and Bakker (2010b, 355) note how market environmentalism’s achievement of “near-
hegemonic status in international policy regimes” by the late 1990s translated into “the ongoing 
reframing of environmental policy at the national and local level, around the world, via key 
mediating organizations” including the likes of the IMF, OECD, UNEP and the World Bank, 
relations described in Chapter Two. The GFOA and CIRANO are more local instances of such 
knowledge producers and mediators, delegated to think on behalf of governments, in a function 
that performs and encourages the adoption of commercially orientated fiscal principles and 
practices that can encourage the greater access of the private sector to the public sector. 
     The GFOA, for instance, advocates “best practices” for outsourcing, direct privatization and 
user fees and so on. And as seen below, this kind of finance culture and its scripts play an 
important role within the network producing problem solving models of an essentially financial 
nature. lxxiiiIn 2002 the GFOA introduced a best practice for “Measuring the Full Cost of 
Government Service” explaining that “Measuring the cost of government services is useful for a 
variety of purposes, including performance measurement and benchmarking; setting user fees 
and charges; privatization; competition initiatives or managed competition.” lxxiv 
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     In Quebec, this thesis traces the introduction of the prescription of full cost recovery to the 
Politique national de l’eau 2002 (69).  Recalling that full cost recovery refers to the 
economization of all the activities that make up water production. The Politique 2002 also 
centralized its influence, over water production, by making municipal funding conditional upon 
compliance with provincial water policy (70). lxxv Since 2005, Montreal has managed its Water 
Services and infrastructure with many of the scripts found in the Province’s Stratégie québécoise 
d’économie d’eau potable (SQEEP) that, according to the website, emerged from the Politique 
2002, in the purported interests of tightening water policy via integrated management and 
sustainable development.lxxvi 
     Collin and Berube (2010) note various techniques of control exerted within the relationship 
between the Quebec government and the municipalities. For instance, periodically the latter must 
transmit various sorts of information to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs on specific dates, as 
described in relation to the Water Services below. Another is the requirement of each 
municipality, in a variety of areas, to obtain the approval of the department concerned before 
implementing a decision, rule or regulation (Collin and Bérubé 2010, 11-12). 
     In 2003, Montreal began its Politique de gestion de l’eau (Water Management Policy) with a 
view to restoring water infrastructure and reorganizing water systems to economize them. With 
Action 17.3 the policy establishes a series of measures aimed at improving the infrastructure 
network in a staggered approach that included “consolidating water budgets and rebalancing 
rates to include all water-related costs.” The introduction of meter-based rates for industrial, 
commercial and institutional buildings was also planned for at this time.lxxvii With these policies 
the ground was prepared for the practice of full cost recovery because to capture all the water-
related costs also involved a process of identifying them. And in this sense the process of 
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disentangling water from other services, with its economization in mind, was now underway. 
     Then in 2008, in Quebec, the economic report Mieux Tarifier Mieux Vivre Ensemble argued 
the case for services paying for themselves in order to become efficient and sustainable, adopting 
an austerity framing predicated upon anti-debt and anti-deficit discourses. Tariffication can be 
seen as a mediating device for exerting fiscal control with the assignation of discrete values for 
further disentangling each service from the mesh of other public services. The Mieux Tarifier 
report echoed that published by the OECD in 2009 « De l’eau pour tous » which otherwise 
focussed on tariffication as a means of fully funding water infrastructure.   
     The Quebec Loi sur la fiscalité (2005) had already authorized municipalities to regulate for 
the financing of goods, services or activities through partial or complete tariffication (19). The 
loose or non-binding nature of the law was partly addressed following the financial crisis of 
2007-2009, by Quebec’s new Politique de financement des services publics in the 2009-2010 
budget, (based on the Mieux tarifier pour mieux vivre ensemble report) that now obliged all state 
entities to adopt tariffication practices that newly included those of transparency of tariff 
calculation and tariff adjustments relative to the total cost of the service in order to justify annual 
tariff increases based on market costs (Mieux tarifier pour mieux vivre ensemble, 2008) Hurteau 
et al (2010) have described how the Neoliberal translation of tariffication in Quebec has 
connected public services such as Health, Hydro and Higher Education to the markets in a 
«rapport purement marchand, de type coûts-bénéfices, entre la population et les services publics 
qui lui sont offerts» (3). 
     This thesis shows how in Montreal the translation of tariffication has combined immutable 
mobiles of user-pay (in which the user is responsible for paying the amount of service used) with 
full cost recovery and the promise of transparency.  In 2009 Montreal saw the transition from a 
 87 
departmental to a service orientation with the City’s new power to resort to users’ fees to cover 
all or part of the cost of certain services. Such fees were to be determined according to «critères 
établis dans une politique de tariffication ». The mediation of transparency as a political tool for 
Neoliberal water and as a particularly powerful rhetoric in Montreal after the procurement 
scandal hit in 2009 is described in Chapter Four. lxxviii 
     At the point of water policy, it is not until the summer of 2015 that Quebec’s Stratégie 
d’économie d’eau potable (SQEEP) introduces tariffication of water as a key policy turn. A 
seemingly perfunctory, conservation policy turn and mostly under the public radar, yet 
signifying, arguably, transformative effects: the policy stipulates for Montreal that if the City 
does not reduce its leakage rate by 10% to 20% by 2017 then Montreal will have to set a tariff 
that reflects the market cost of water using the new calculation for pricing that includes the cost 
of infrastructure, its upgrades, and loans, as described earlier in this chapter (Service de l’eau 
2015, 4-5). 
     This target of 10% is an ultimatum that appears to be asking the impossible of Montreal’s 
Water Service, given that since 2006 only 7% of the distribution system has been upgraded i.e. 
300km of pipes and when the average annual rate of leakage reduction is only 0, 8%. Even 
though 2014 saw the highest rate of upgrades compared to the previous 9 years, the leak rate of 
30% did not budge (Service de l’eau 2015, 12). Judging by past performance, it seems highly 
unlikely that Montreal will realize its target of a 10% reduction between now and 2017. In part 
because the system of 9 196 km of pipes is so vast and also because the process of leakage 
detection (auscultation) is finding new leaks all the time. Montreal voices its full commitment to 
the SQEEP, reasoning that « la contribution de Montréal dans l’atteinte des objectifs de la 
SQEEP est fondamentale » given its status as the most important city of the Province.lxxix 
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     As such SQEEP speaks for the network for the globalization and financialization of Montreal 
water.  And SQEEP, demands adequate tariffication that reflects all the costs of production. 
The City indicates on its website that when meter installations of non-residential buildings are 
near completion in 2017 it promises to measure consumption more accurately to assess an 
adequate tariffication for residential and non-residential users. lxxxIt stands to reason here that an 
adequate tariffication will be one that not only reflects full cost recovery but one that is applied 
to all Montrealers. 
     Montreal’s Water Report 2014 clearly states that if the City does not set a tariff that reflects 
the full costs of production then the City will lose its provincial funding (Service de l’eau 2015, 
4). A matter of diminishing returns when only 4.1 % of Montreal’s funding comes from federal 
and provincial transfers in 2016. lxxxiBut regardless of the funding threat, water tariffication has 
not arisen as a controversy in the municipal administration. Judging by their platforms and 
performance, no party in the municipal administration is opposed to tariffication, and no party is 
anything other than market environmentalist.lxxxii  In 2017, or not long thereafter, it seems highly 
likely that all Montrealers and not just metered ICI (non-residential buildings) will be paying a 
water tariff that reflects full cost recovery. 
     It is also likely that for many Montrealers tariffication would come as a surprise since the 
term tariffication often seem to go hand in hand with universal metering, and few residential 
buildings are metered on the Island of Montreal. Leroux et al (2014) clarifies, in research for 
CIRANO that residential buildings do not need to be metered for all Montrealers to pay a tariff. 
He finds that though greater economic efficiency would ideally require universal residential 
metering, non-residential should, as a halfway measure and by deduction, provide «une 
évaluation de la consommation typique des ménages résidentiels » and therefore the means for 
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tariff setting of all Montrealers (57-58).    
     To more fully grasp the significance of the prospect of water tariffication in Montreal, it is 
necessary to consider what exactly is meant by the full costs of water production here. The City’s 
new calculation for costing water i.e. the cost of services for every 1000 litres of water 
production, currently includes maintenance, purification, and operations, bringing the cost of 
water, as reported in the Water Report 2014, to $1.36 per m3 (Service de l’eau 2015, 4, 9). 
However the Water Report 2014 also indicates that another 83 cents would need to be added to 
cover the inherited debt and investment to be realized (Service de l’eau 2015, 9).  It stands to 
reason that by 2017, a tariffication “adéquate” for full cost recovery and user-pay would likely 
reflect Montreal’s considerable and rising debt obligations at the point of water.   
     Using data that has emerged while tracing the the pathways of the Network’s intermediaries 
in the form of marketizing scripts, the following explores issues pertaining to tariffication as it 
relates to water production costs that are set to include water debt for infrastructural investment. 
Water Financialization as Infrastructural Investment 
     What are the processes and relations that lead to large private loans for the procurement of 
water infrastructural investment?  How does this reality relate to both tariffication and increasing 
private influence over water production?   Tracing the Network’s marketizing scripts leads this 
analysis to the economizing processes in the City’s Water Strategy that translate infrastructure 
into assets for the purpose of debt leveraging. This thesis finds that effects of these practices can 
be traced to municipal budgets and a formal role and voice for credit ratings agencies in the 
City’s financial decision-making.     
     In 2014, Montreal’s executive committee approved private debt of $4 562 billion as part of its 
three year investment program 2015-2017 (PTI). The case being made is that larger loans will 
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allow the City the time it needs to plan and execute the works needed and to also better manage 
the debt.  This is the reason given by the City for increasing its investment loans by 20%, from 
$719 (on average) 2010-2013 to $1.3 billion in 2014 to $2.1 billion by 2024. lxxxiii 
     For this amortization to happen in the first place Montreal had to transform its infrastructure 
into assets, which involved an assessment by Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) in 2003 that 
estimated the total value of all water assets in the City to be $39.2 billion, as detailed in 
Montreal’s Water Strategy (Service de l’eau 2011, 98). This process of economization has 
allowed the City to use its infrastructure as collateral for leveraging debt with private financial 
institutions through both large direct loans and bond issuance. This culture has been encouraged 
by GFOA’s best practices advocating asset creation and asset management of municipal 
infrastructure. lxxxiv Best practices for economic development and investment planning prioritize 
the need to identify infrastructure that can generate revenue.lxxxv 
     The City’s Water Strategy 2011 explains that «La Gestion d'actifs, appliquée au domaine de 
l'eau, consiste à considérer les infrastructures (conduites, vannes, bornes-fontaines, usines, etc.) 
non pas comme des pièces détachées d’équipement qu’on doit gérer une par une grâce à un 
budget de DÉPENSES, mais comme des éléments d’actifs pris dans leur ensemble (donc en 
pièces attachées), constituant un portefeuille d’actifs dans lequel on INVESTIT » (the City’s 
emphasis). The claim made by the Strategy is that to translate the City into a portfolio of assets is 
to allow for the elaboration of a preventative, rather than a reactive policy, which involves 
systematic and ongoing evaluation, maintenance and upgrading (Service de l’eau: annexe 2011, 
39).    
     The calculation at play is, as the City notes, «la somme allouée aux investissements annuels 
doit correspondre à la valeur totale des actifs divisée par le nombre d’années de leur espérance 
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moyenne de vie» (Service de l’eau 2011, 97). This translates as the sum that is allocated to 
annual investments must correspond to the total value of the assets divided by the estimated 
lifespan. This means that every time more leaks are detected the estimated lifespan of the City’s 
water assets drops, and the more the lifespan drops the more debt that can be leveraged and 
allocated to maintain the value of the assets. When the lifespan increases then less debt is 
required. This means that the cost of water production is uncertain to a degree that is « non 
négligeable » tied as it is to leakage detection and debt leveraging (Service de l’eau 2015, 9). 
     This analysis joins the dots showing how leakage detection relates to setting a tariffication 
“adéquate” in 2017: Leakage detection in the primary system of large pipes won’t be complete 
until 2017, and converges with the deadline for metering most non-residential buildings. This 
appears to mean that the data from leakage detection will derive the new estimated lifespan of 
the water system and therefore the amount of further investment/debt required according to the 
parameter set by the Water Strategy 2011. The near completion of metering non-residential 
buildings will allow for the dividing of production costs between residential and non-residential 
dwellings. These findings will likely inform a tariffication “adéquate” that reflects the new water 
pricing calculation that will likely include the cost of water infrastructure debt, in line with the 
script of full cost recovery. 
     This reliance upon debt leveraging inevitably brings Montreal ever more under the watchful 
and influential eye of private actors i.e. shareholders, stock managers and those agencies that rate 
the credit worthiness of the City in relation to the financial risk the City carries. Debt-leveraging 
practices present a risk to lenders, as noted by the City in its financial policy, « Pour sa part, la 
Ville représente un risque pour le prêteur».  This is a risk that is directly reflected in the ability of 
the City to responsibly manage its debt obligations, according to which the credit ratings 
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agencies rate the risk of doing business with the City. 
     The lower the credit rating given by the agency, the higher the interest paid by the City to its 
creditors on its bonds and loans i.e. “dans son coût de financement”. It follows therefore that 
« La Ville a avantage à ce que les marchés financiers la perçoivent comme un gestionnaire 
responsable et rigoureux qui présente un risque très faible. » This relation is clarified in the 
City’s financial policy, that explains how « Les marchés financiers se réfèrent généralement aux 
agences de notation pour apprécier ce risque par le fait même la qualité de la gestion de la 
Ville. » lxxxvi 
     Of course, though it’s not stated directly, debt leveraging also represents a risk not only to 
investors but also to the City i.e. that is the risk of default (Hanniman 2014, 3).  17% of the 
budget, or $868 million, goes towards servicing the City’s overall debt in 2016. lxxxviiWhile the 
2015 water budget forecast showed that 27% of Montreal’s water service operating budget was 
needed to pay off interest to private financial institutions and bond holders. lxxxviii Whether or not 
this performance of debt and its relations within the network are worth the risk, is for another 
study.  The concern here is with the private influence over the City’s water management that 
such financial practices, principles and their relations usher in, further materializing, and 
institutionalizing a culture that valorizes water infrastructure commercially, first and foremost, 
rather than socially. 
     Owing to the relation between the markets and the credit ratings agencies, it stands to reason 
that the more the City’s administration relies upon the markets the more it falls under the 
influence of its knowledge producers and mediators. In fact, this analysis finds that Montreal 
makes no bones about the role of the credit ratings agencies within the decision-making 
apparatus of the City. The finance policy indicates that «À cet égard, [the City] doit établir des 
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relations avec ces dernières et surtout leur donner toutes les informations nécessaires à 
l'évaluation de la cote de crédit de la Ville. » The credit ratings agencies decide and advise how 
Montreal is to proceed in order for the latter to realize its debt obligations, « Elle prendra en 
considération les commentaires émis par ces dernières et, le cas échéant, adoptera les stratégies 
qui s'imposent. » lxxxix 
     Hanniman (2014) points to how the credit ratings agencies always prefer creditor-friendly 
policies such as those that discipline for good fiscal and transparent management practices, but 
also those that increase government flexibility and the ability to respond to market fluctuations 
and crises. The latter tendency dis-encourages long-term, socially oriented government 
commitments such as those that speak to narrowing the gap between rich and poor (9). In fact, 
from the point of view of the credit ratings agencies, the less that revenue and investment 
channels are embroiled within the governmental system the better.  Which is one reason perhaps 
why the City has not increased its Water Tax, levied since 2004, to address the water 
infrastructure deficit.xc   
     Montreal’s reliance upon the positive regard of the credit ratings agencies underlines the 
degree to which, “the infrastructure project itself must be translated into the legible terms of 
financial investors” (Bresnihan 2015, 2). To restate this idea from Chapter Two, the investor and 
the investment must be made compatible and speak to each other in the same financial language, 
expressing similar values. Montreal’s financial policies and water can be seen to team up to 
deliver scripts and practices that do just this: user-pay, full cost recovery, conservation and ‘true 
value’ scripts are enlisted to translate household water users into revenue streams and to further 
normalize a culture that valorizes water infrastructure, first and foremost, commercially, rather 
than socially. 
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Tariffication and its Relations for Governance 
     Given these relations, this thesis argues that the distinction between tariffication and a rate of 
property taxation becomes very important to understanding the transformation underway in 
Montreal water. Tariffication stands in opposition to paying for water through property taxation 
and gathers together large revenues, capital and debt and paves the way for a corporatized 
regulatory governance, over the current governmental system of democratic procedures.   
     Regulatory governance, described in Chapter Two, would likely favor the greater 
commercialization of Water Services and its infrastructure and its full transformation into 
commodities and assets, unfettered by the demands of other public services and/or socio-
economic solidarity considerations involving wealth redistribution within the governmental 
system (Besnihan 2015). 
     In fact, this separation, or “ring-fencing” of services is another of the recommendations made 
by Leroux et al (2014) for CIRANO, for reasons stated of financial and environmental 
efficiencies: « Éloigner la gestion des services d’eau des préoccupations budgétaires 
gouvernementales: Les gestionnaires des services d’eau doivent avoir un objectif 
d’autofinancement » (42). In fact, the objective of autofinancement (self-financing in cash 
revenues) was stated in Montreal’s Water Strategy in 2011. While only the government manages 
taxation, the reigns of tariffication might even be fully handed over to some form of para-
municipal in some kind of corporate entity, a direction that the network may well be heading, as 
seen further along. 
     The Province and the City present the rationale for a tariff in Montreal’s Water Report 2014, 
chiefly as a matter of achieving financial efficiencies and environmental sustainability (Service 
de l’eau 2015). The Province has claimed that paying for services through taxation amounts to a 
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subsidy for the wealthy rather than the true price exacted through tariffication; however, as 
Hurteau et al (2010) argue, that taxation ensures the wealthy pay proportionately more for public 
services (18). Moreover, tariffication can present a reason to reduce taxation. Leroux et al (2014), 
for CIRANO, recommends all water tariffication be accompanied by a corresponding drop in the 
taxation allocated to Water Services (4). 
     The Province and the City also lean heavily on the environmental promise of tariffication, one 
of their main claims being that it encourages responsible demand based on available information 
(i.e. metric data). The rationale being that user fees framed within a tariffication policy «donnent 
une information sur le coût du service et permettent au citoyen de juger de sa pertinence et de 
son utilité. » xci 
     Hamel (2012), however, references studies in the field from Barraqué (2001), Mouillart 
(1995) and Valiron (1991) to make the point that the demand for water is mostly “inelastic” i.e. 
not responsive to price fluctuations. Which is to say therefore that it is structural and varies 
predictably among and between the sectors of industry, commerce, institutions and the residential 
(3).  Tariffication as a conservation tool for households is mostly redundant according to this 
research. And, as a case in point, the City’s own data shows that conservation targets were 
realized last year thanks to public education, new technologies and leakage reduction (Service de 
l’eau 2015, 8). 
     Elsewhere, market driven tariffication, informed by user-pay and full cost recovery, has made 
water increasingly unaffordable for many, leading to thousands of water disconnections in the 
US following the best practices of the American Water Works Association (AWWA) that also 
informs the policy for the Environmental Network here in Quebec. While efforts among low 
income households to scrimp on water have had negative health consequences related to 
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sanitation and the spread of bacteria (Hamel 2012, 3). 
     Such socio-environmental effects are not usually reflected in a financialized approach to 
water; they are not taken into account.  Hurteau et al (2010), for the Institut de recherche et 
d’informations socio-économiques (IRIS), have documented how user-pay and full cost recovery 
within public services in Quebec have lead to the prioritization of narrow fiscal objectives over 
and above broad social considerations, until «L’objectif n’est plus de baser le financement des 
services publics sur les besoins de la population, mais sur la performance économique des 
administrateurs qui sera mesurée à leur capacité d’autofinancer leurs établissements» (3).xcii 
      The logic of financialization culture leads to increasing pressure upon public service 
administrators to make individual services pay for themselves in a kind of imperative, that if 
blinkered enough, produces the kind of socio-environmental negligence in which water 
contamination and subsequent fatalities have occurred: Walkerton, Ontario and Flint, Michigan 
are cases in point. xciii 
     Hurteau et al (2010) have analyzed realities of the «revolution tarifaire» in Quebec and 
various practices translating Health, Hydro and Higher Education.  The authors describe «une 
rupture radicale» with the principle of redistribution of wealth that has historically informed a 
progressive taxation within a social democratic regime, in favor of a system of regressive 
tariffication informed by a «néolibéralisme extreme». In this system the rich pay the same as the 
poor «pour le même service, assimilé à un simple produit de consommation, plutôt qu’à un 
besoin et un droit»; a reality in which the poor are disproportionately being impacted (37): by 
2010 the new tarification, for households with a university student, translated into a 17, 98% 
increase for low income families, compared to a 2, 40% increase for high income households (3). 
     Social effects of the inefficiencies of Neoliberal Network(s) elsewhere have been well 
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documented, as seen in Chapter Two. This analysis finds, however, that such effects are wholly 
externalized in the policy documentation and largely so in Quebec’s mainstream media. In fact 
the City presents a very partial idea of user-pay/tariffication practice, its hinterlands, relations 
and performativity. For instance, the City does not supply empirical data in support of its 
conservation rationale for the user-pay script. I argue that this reality suggests the pertinence of 
user-pay can only be judged in the context of the whole of Montreal’s water production and all 
its relations. Within this lens, the Water Report 2014, as well as the provincial and municipal 
Water Strategies can be seen to absent tariffication’s close relationship to water-related market 
movements. 
     Scripts of user-pay, full cost recovery, conservation and ‘true value’ are used in policy 
documents to rationalize the tariffication of water production and water performance.  However, 
what of other performance measurements? What does ‘true value’ and tying tariffication to 
production costs and therefore market movements mean in terms of risk? As described above, 
tying Montreal water directly to the financial markets raises investment capital but also exposes 
the City to risk: markets are unpredictable, periodically volatile and distorted by investor 
practices, such as herding and other practices encouraging bubble formations, described in 
Chapter Two. Relatedly, water’s lengthening outsourced supply chain is also made riskier and 
more precarious owing to this more hidden market exposure. 
     Unsurprisingly perhaps, such riskiness is barely hinted at in establishment policy documents, 
as seen above. Nevertheless, the annex to Montreal’s Water Strategy, describes water 
infrastructure as so many assets, that turns councillors and administrators into asset managers 
that must now adapt their decision making process to negotiate «un context toujours en 
changement […] axées sur le risque» (Le Service de l’eau: annexe 2011, 44). Critics of market 
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environmentalism have observed how at odds such practices can be with public service values. 
     In fact, Montreal’s likely tariffication and its market relations would make it even easier to 
transfer the Water Service into the hands of a commercially orientated corporate operator. In fact, 
a new law in 2016 is to give Montreal the status of metropolis. xcivAnd in the report available on 
the mayor’s page of the City’s website “A Prosperous and Inclusive Metropolis for sustainable 
development” point 17 advocates that “the City consider combining, within a sole external 
organization, some of its services with a large number of organizations within its city limits; that 
the board of directors of this new entity give a prominent position to the mayor and municipal 
decision-makers, while mobilizing leaders of Montréal’s economic community.” xcv Water 
Services for the Island of Montreal comprise a large number of organizations, purification plants, 
pipes, aquifers and so on, in a fully integrated infrastructure and so would answer this 
qualification. Montreal water has already adopted principles and practices typical of corporatized 
utilities; as McDonald (2014) observes, “Since the late 1970s, corporatized public utilities have 
been run increasingly on market-oriented operating principles such as financialized performance 
indicators, cost-reflexive pricing and competitive outsourcing” (2).   
     Though corporatization of Water Services can involve solidarity practices, all the signs, 
interpreted here, appear to indicate a much more market-friendly direction, likely not averse to 
the improved credit ratings and borrowing opportunities that, as McDonald (2014) notes, the 
separation from governmental finances often brings (2). McDonald (2014) also points to studies 
by (Hood 1991; McDonald and Ruiters 2012a; Moynihan 2006; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; 
Shirley 1999) that show corporatization is often instigated with a view to full privatization once 
the profit potential of the public corporation is fully exhausted (2). 
     This analysis argues that in Montreal with the new price calculation for water set to connect 
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all production costs and all water infrastructure to the markets via the likely tariffication of all 
Montrealers and the normalization of debt leveraging, a considerable amount of revenue and 
capital seems set to be channeled away from the property tax-based governmental system (with 
its propensity for social redistribution) and into a corporatized agency. This transformation 
appears to be a matter of redistribution and commodification in which Montreal performs the 
increasing transfer of public water wealth to the public service industry (PSI) facilitated by an 
influx of private decision makers into the public realm. 
     This analysis make the case for understanding the globalization and financialization of 
Montreal water procurement as situated within Canada and Quebec’s Neoliberal regime but also 
to be a complex network of hinterlands, actors, practices, scripts and emergent relations of 
commodification. This chapter has shown some of the political decisions, legal, policy, corporate 
and technological relations that are facilitating the emergence of the network. There are other 
relations however, important to understanding how Montreal Water Economy is materializing at 
arms-length from politics. Chapter Four describes the translation of actors externalizing social 










Separating Politics from Economy: Materializing “fair” Water 
     Chapter Three described emergent procurement devices and their relations in Montreal that 
are encouraging the transformation of water-related infrastructure and services into private assets 
that can be globally traded and monetized on the financial markets. This chapter demonstrates 
that effects of the network show how in order to fully economize an object such as water-related 
infrastructure (that includes water production) necessitates subsuming other relations such as 
democratic procedures, social and environmental conditions to that of the monetary realm in the 
interests of corporate power and profit making. 
     Harvey writes that “For any system of thought to become dominant, it requires the 
articulation of fundamental concepts that become so deeply embedded in common sense 
understandings that they are taken for granted and beyond question. For this to occur, not any old 
concepts will do. A conceptual apparatus has to be constructed that appeals almost naturally to 
our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities that seem 
to inhere in the social world we inhabit” (Harvey 2007, 24). Within an ANT taxonomy when this 
effect is achieved the network is said to be punctualized and experienced as a reality that a 
critical mass of people do not question i.e. as a fact.  Law (2014), has observed, following Latour 
(2004b), that facts cannot be disentangled from their values, that each implies the other; a 
concept well captured by Latour’s term ‘matter of concern’ (22). 
     An ANT analysis reveals political relations within the materialization of an object such as 
water as not only a matter of politicians, government programs and the electorate. In “From 
Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public” Latour (2005) shows how “objects—
taken as so many issues [matters of concern] - bind all of us in ways that map out a public space 
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profoundly different from what is usually recognized under the label of the political” (15). This 
is the political of the object understood as a network of relations between practices and their 
values, that can, for instance, connect a water meter to a trade agreement, the financial markets, 
local conservation, corporations, a water pricing calculation, politicians and local water users.  
An understanding of objects as networks with values can reveal previously hidden political-
economic relations, sites of concern and even potential controversy.   
     Through an ANT material semiotics, this case study has described translations of Montreal’s 
water-related infrastructure procurement as embedded with powerful, value-laden prescriptions 
for a Green Economy: user-pay, full cost recovery, ‘true value’ and market efficiencies. I have 
shown their inscription within practices related to procurement: globalized compulsory 
competitive tendering, economies of scale, debt-leveraging, and a new pricing calculation for a 
new tariffication, among other related practices.  In combination, these practices and their 
inscriptions for Neoliberal water-related procurement in Montreal can be seen to externalize the 
translation of public water as a Commons, as they translate Montreal water with a new 
financialized problem solving culture of prescriptions and formulas. 
     Callon and Caliskan (2010b) invoke research (Muniesa, 2003; Guyer, 2009) that shows that 
“the actors themselves directly link the question of the fairness of prices to the content and 
construction of formulas serving to calculate them: it is not the prices that are fair or unfair, but 
their modalities of calculation, i.e. their formulas)” (Caliskan, Callon, 18).  Emergent practices of 
Montreal Water are materializing public water as a thing that can be ‘fair’ if it is measured, 
transparent and uses Green Economy prescriptions. As such, this emergent reality and its values 
materialize new concepts of what is fair. One effect of this new performance of ‘fairness’ is the  
obfuscation of a deeper extension of private property rights into Montreal Water Services. How 
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is this new translation of ‘fairness’ performing and materializing at the point of Montreal Water 
Services? What are its relations and effects? 
Equity, and the Translation of ‘Fairness’   
     Folco (2014) has observed that in Quebec « le principe de redistribution est délibérément 
écarté, la justice sociale et la démocratie étant du même coup considérées comme des valeurs 
morales extérieures à la gestion technique et dépolitisée de la fiscalité municipale» (Folco 2014). 
While tracing the network’s relations shows that indeed the principles or values of redistribution, 
and democracy are being translated out of municipal water policy, it is also the case that other 
values are being translated in. These new values of user pay and full cost recovery are inscribed 
in the practice of tariffication, which in relation to the new pricing calculation for water, directly 
ties water users to Montreal’s water-related procurement. Again, for the practice of tariffication 
to translate into the network it needs to appear “fair” to a critical mass of users (Caliskan, Callon, 
18).   
     Neoliberal policy texts such as Mieux Tarifier Mieux Vivre Ensemble (2008) generally 
introduced into both policy and popular discourse a distinction between those that are deserving 
of social solidarity policy, such as guaranteed state assistance, and those that are not. The report 
reasoned that it would be more efficient to only subsidize low revenue households, rather than 
have everyone pay the same inadequate rate that failed to cover the full cost of service provision 
(31-32). This view externalized the fact that the more progressive a taxation system is, the more 
it ensures that users of public services pay an amount proportionate to their income so that the 
wealthier users are, the more they pay (Hurteau et al 2010, 18). Quebec and Montreal’s 
translation of tariffication thus far is entirely regressive, as seen in Chapter Three, since it makes 
no allowances for users’ capacity to pay, not a factor of importance in water yet due to the 
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emergent nature of the network. 
     The other prescription performed by the report was the setting of tariffs, making users 
individually pay for what they use, to fully cover the entire cost of producing a service. Leroux et 
al (2014) for Cirano have reasoned that, where Water Services are concerned, in the interests of 
being ‘fair’, water users should pay for what they individually use, «pour s’assurer que les 
consommateurs consciencieux ne subventionnent pas indûment le comportement de 
consommateurs irresponsables» (i). Critics and even government’s own data have pointed to the 
redundancy of this view given the inelastic nature of services such as electricity and water, as 
described in Chapter Three (Hamel 2012, 3); in Montreal 93% of Water Service costs are said to 
be fixed, therefore structural, predictable and not very influenced by consumption patterns 
(Service de l’eau 2015, 15, 9). 
     In fact, the Mieux Tarifier report externalized how tariffication of provincial services and its 
inscriptions undermines the system of income taxation.  Provincial income taxation, like 
municipal property taxation, feeds a governmental system of service provision that enables a 
close relation between democratic decision-making and redistributive social solidarity policy. A 
tariffication system, on the other hand, ring-fences a service, facilitating the cutting of this 
local/social tie with citizens in favor of a more corporatized political decision-making i.e. 
governance (Hurteau et al 2010, 37).    
     Following Hurteau et al (2010), this thesis observes that whereas the taxation system is suited 
to operationalizing the principle of vertical equity by contributing to a reduction in vertical 
inequality i.e. the gap between rich and poor, the tariffication systems being translated in Quebec 
and Montreal finance policy operationalize the principle of horizontal equity via the user-pay 
prescription according to which « chaque contribuable contribue au coût des services en fonction 
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des bénéfices qu’il en reçoit, dans la mesure du possible ».xcvi 
     In Quebec muncipalities the provincial finance policy states, «dans la contexte où la 
redistribution de la richesse ne fait pas partie du mandat des municipalités, la critère d`équité 
verticale n`est pas pertinent à la fiscalité municipale. »xcvii According to this policy inscription 
the principle of vertical equity would not inform municipal Water Services because as Leroux et 
al (2014) explain, historically, this is the jurisdiction of Social Services and the province of 
Quebec that provides social aid to facilitate access to housing and therefore water too (Leroux 
2014, 1). 
     However, the case made here is that this view externalizes how Montreal’s Water Services 
have historically performed as an essential public service that prioritizes universal access 
regardless of ability to pay in a collective responsibility. Montreal’s Water Strategy 2011-2020 
even references the City’s mission in the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities of 2006 to 
«s’assurer qu’aucune citoyenne et qu’aucun citoyen ne sera privé d’accès à l’eau potable pour 
des motifs d’ordre économique […]» (Service de l’eau 2011, 8). 
     I note, however, only a few lines later on the same page, the Strategy actually distances itself 
from this position of collective responsibility for water access, indicating that the Water Strategy 
had not intended the Charter’s declaration of principles to «encadrer fermement son engagement 
à l’égard de la gestion de l’eau ». From there it goes on to frame its water policy in a new 
tariffication predicated upon « tous les facteurs de coûts relies aux divers services de l’eau, de 
sorte d’assurer dans un proche avenir un financement adéquat des vrais coûts de l’eau » (the 
City’s own emphasis) (Service de l’eau 2011, 8). Here we see the principle of collective 
responsibility for water access in a social democratic vein that observes the principle of vertical 
equity being translated out of Montreal water in favour of the principle of ‘true value’. This 
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prepares the way, by extension, for a fiscally framed horizontal equity in which everyone pays 
the market price for the water they use.   
     This analysis finds that Montreal’s Water Strategy makes the case that water users have not 
been paying enough to address the City’s situation of economic water scarcity, and need to pay 
the ‘true value’ of maintaining their water system, invoking the Green Economy script that sees 
the markets offering the closest approximation to a ‘fair’ price for water production. And that any 
alternatives for Montrealers to cover the cost of their water system, mentioned below, to obviate 
the need for the marketization of their water infrastructure, go undebated. The implication here is 
that the costs of all aspects of production should be pegged to the markets and that globalized 
markets stimulating competition and economies of scale will deliver Water Services at a fair 
price; a prescription that externalizes potentially price-distorting subsidies. This is an instance of 
network scripts translating and defining a new reality.   
     This analysis finds that another kind of horizontal equity is also introduced in Montreal’s 
Water Strategy, that of intergenerational equity. Both Montreal’s Water Strategy and Leroux et al 
(2014) for CIRANO, invoke this principle of dispersing the cost of holding large long-term debt 
to pay for water infrastructure over successive generations of users (Service de l’eau 2011, 44; 
Leroux et al 2014, 42). This is the practice of amortization i.e. a fixed repayment schedule over 
time.xcviii The logic also follows that for the administration to introduce a huge hike in water 
service costs only while the infrastructure is receiving the bulk of investment would be 
unacceptable to those users paying the bulk. 
     Intergenerational equity performs as a leveller on a level playing field over time. The network 
does this by translating debt-leveraging as amortization and a kind of horizontal equity. This 
translation externalizes, however, the potential for amortization, when factored into a new 
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tariffication, to burden low income water service users unequally, as Hurteau et al have 
demonstrated is the case for electricity, health tariffs and higher educaion as described in Chapter 
Three (Hurteau et al 2010, 3). 
     Amortization is also translated as a commitment intended to distance Water Services from 
political changes of heart to enable efficient Water Services (Leroux et al 2014, 31-32). However, 
argued here is, that the “fairness” inscription of amortization can also be seen to obscure the 
additional influence of and reliance upon private financial institutions and the Credit Ratings 
Agencies, not to mention the interest on immense loans from private creditors that users are 
likely to pay for in a regressive tariffication in the not too distant future, as noted in Chapter 
Three. 
Resistances 
     As described above, tariffication is opposed to taxation for services, which is associated with 
social relations that compromise wealth creation (Brennan 2012, 27). In this reality, alternative 
forms of financing to that of private financing are also externalized. These can include, for 
instance, a mix of progressive property and income taxation and public banking (Loxley 2012). 
Such knowledge production as alternative prescriptions performs as a form of resistance: in 
Quebec there is the progressive provincial party Quebec Solidaire that proposes partially 
nationalized banking, to “Assurer un investissement suffisant et strictement public dans les 
infrastructures de transmission et d’épuration de l’eau.»xcix 
     In Quebec there is also La Coalition opposée à la tarification et à la privatiation des services 
publics, of more than 100 civil society groups including unions, students and feminists. The 
Coalition formed in 2009 with the advent of the Liberal government’s austerity budget and 
program to step up tarification of public services with user-pay the hallmark of its problem 
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solving strategy. The Coalition associates privatization and tariffication as processes of 
«marchandisation» or commodification and challenges the problem solving culture legitimizing 
commodification of public services by both demanding adequate financing of public services and 
also by proposing policy and programs for refinancing the State in a sustainable manner that 
takes into consideration individuals capacity to pay and for fair employment. The program 
provides 10 billion dollars of fiscal measures to raise revenues, control costs and redistribute 
wealth, with a view to showing that «les hausses régressives de taxes, les coupures dans les 
programmes sociaux, et l’imposition de tarifs ne sont pas les seules options existantes. »c 
     The Coalition proposes very different performance measures than those materializing in the 
network for the globalization and financialization of Montreal’s water-related procurement: «une 
société plus juste, plus écologiste, plus égalitaire, plus solidaire et plus démocratique.ci However, 
Neoliberal commodification practices are multiple and there are practices that the Coalition’s 
fiscal/redistribution focus does not capture: such as practices and their relations increasing the 
influence of private and corporate power in government decision-making, standards making, 
knowledge production, economic policy, and international law at the point of trade agreements 
that threaten to lock in procurement of public services and the vagaries of the markets. 
     Quebec’s largest water advocacy group, EauSecours! argues against the commodification of 
Quebec’s water and for collective responsibility for its production, distribution and access. And 
it has advocated for water being recognized as a common good, demanding « la fin de la 
privatisation des services d’eau et que soient remis au secteur public les services qui auraient pu 
être privatisés », as seen in a declaration from 2002.cii It points to the facilitating relation between 
water privatization and residential tariffication.ciii 
      EauSecours! is also part of a broad spectrum of civil society groups across Quebec that 
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includes l’Association pour une taxe sur les transactions financières et pour l’action citoyenne 
(ATTAC).  ATTAC claimes a million members, across Europe and Canada, that oppose CETA 
and the threat they argue, it poses to public services such as water on account of local 
procurement restrictions described in Chapters Two and Three.civ  In a memoir from 2015 
responding to the provincial government’s Sustainable Development Strategy, ATTAC opposes 
« l’approche de participation publique favorisant le secteur des affaires que nous avons observée 
concernant les négociations ». It demands « un débat démocratique digne de ce nom qui, à ce 
jour, n’a toujours pas eu lieu. » cv 
     In summary, this analysis finds that while there is resistance to some practices of 
commodification there has been no network analysis connecting emergent financializing and 
globalizing procurement practices in Montreal, that anticipates the regressive extraction via 
residential tarification of not only revenues for water production but also economic rent in the 
form of interest on large private debt servicing. A privatizing framing also misses the 
financializing mediations of financial actors for both profit for investors and their increasing 
influence over the City. 
     As such, this analysis argues that without a network analysis that takes in emergent practices, 
local actors in resistance to globalization and financialization can miss important commodifying 
processes via networked devices and relations formatting water commodification into the fabric 
of the City. In this respect we can overlook new lines of resistance, as suggested by what follows. 
Human and Non-Human Mediations 
     From an ANT perspective, this analysis makes the case for how multiple types of mediations 
are necessary to materializing the social, environmental and economic transformation of 
Montreal water via procurement (Latour 2005b, 59).  Both human and non-human, i.e. 
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“concatenations of mediators”, of actors of all kinds are required.  An actor can be powerful or 
less so but is any element “which makes other elements dependent upon itself and translates their 
will into a language of its own” (Callon, Latour, 1981, 286). 
     There are those deceptively simple practices/devices that are also important network actors 
changing Montrealers’ relations with their water and with one another by imparting the notion of 
what is ‘fair’ as that which can be scientifically measured, transparent, simple and promote 
horizontal equity. Such devices include water meters measuring consumption, and auscultation 
devices, that literally sound out and detect cracks and leaks in the system of underground water 
pipes. These kinds of practices, though simple, are inscribed with translations of ‘fair’ that turn 
on personal responsibility by making water usage and wastage transparent: as described in 
Chapter Two, Green Economy understands that transparency encourages individual conservation 
when the price of water is attributed a ‘true’ and higher value through the markets; higher values 
are claimed to deter overconsumption and the payment for water production that one has not 
used (Quiggin 2009, 240; Leroux et al 2014, i).      
     Auscultation and water meters speak through their intermediaries in the form of data that 
passes between them and other actors. This form of communication constitutes what is social 
about them, remembering from Chapter One that “The social can be read in the inscriptions that 
mark the intermediaries” (Callon 1991, 140).  In the City’s translation, in its finance policy, this 
data is an intermediary inscribed with transparency and simplicity values that inform the user-
pay practice, framed within a policy of tariffication that provides «une information sur le coût du 
service et permettent au citoyen de juger de sa pertinence et de son utilité. »cvi 
     Transparency and simplicity are inscribed upon Montreal’s fiscal policy «le système fiscal 
municipal doit être aussi simple à comprendre et à appliquer que possible, autant que pour les 
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municipales que pour le contribuable » (20).  And in this regard, auscultation and water meters 
can be seen to speak for Montreal’s fiscal policy. Along with all the relations described in 
Chapter Three, transparency and simplicity can be read as scripts of New Public Management 
that are intended to distinguish it from what proponents perceive as the impenetrable quality of 
public bureaucracy (Furlong and Bakker 2010b, 350). 
     Moreover, in Montreal, meters and auscultation, can be seen as pivotal to the network for the 
globalization and financialization of Water-related procurement, since, as argued in Chapter 
Three, meters tie water consumption and infrastructure to tariffication, while auscultation ties 
water infrastructure to debt leveraging and to tariffication, and tariffication pegs Montreal water 
consumers to the global financial markets for water-related commodities.cvii Metering and 
auscultation produce values in the form of data (intermediaries) that are fed into the new 
calculation for pricing water that informs the new tariffication of how much revenue, profit and 
capital to extract from users for Water Services, subcontractors, investors and investment.   
     Turnhout and Neves (2014) note that “science-based measurement is part and parcel of 
contemporary neoliberal environmental governance. It produces the raw materials, so to say, for 
subsequent centralized control and exchange.” The authors assert the performativity of the 
transparency script and its scientific measurement practices: “Its epistemic authority makes us 
see the world in a specific way that makes possible specific ways of acting upon it while 
silencing others. As such, it has the tendency to create the world in its own image (Bowker, 
2000) because only what is counted counts”. In this regard, the authors invoke Scott (1998) to 
observe that “Knowledge is not merely an instrument for control […] it is a form of control 
itself” (Turnhout and Neves 2014, 594). 
     This form of knowledge production also performs a reality that externalizes other practices 
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and other knowledges. This analysis finds the translation of tariffication appears to materialize 
naturally as a solution to ailing water infrastructure, thanks to such measurements and formulas 
translated and performed as unbiased and ‘fair’ in the same way for everyone.  So that in the City 
the concern has largely become not how we are raising the capital for investment and how much 
we outsource and how these choices impact municipal decision-making and performance 
measures and who decides, but rather how many water leaks, how much water is being lost and 
what the market value of this inefficiency to the City is. Clearly, financialized problem-solving 
models produce financialized solutions. 
Residential Tariffication Translated! 
     Having traced the teleology and trajectory of Montreal’s emergent network anticipating 
residential tariffication, it suddenly arrives:  Early 2016, financialized translations of fair water 
become punctualized in towns on the Island of Montreal. An article titled “City, Suburbs Settle 
Nagging Grievances” reports that towns within the Montreal agglomeration (comprising the 
Island of Montreal outside of the City) have agreed to pay for water via the new pricing 
calculation based on their metered consumption of water, rather than through property valued 
taxation. They are agreeing to water production costs and revenues being separated from tax 
revenue.cviii 
     Horizontal equity is achieved via the installation of water meters at the entry point of each 
town, that provide accurate readings of the town’s usage; since many of the suburbs have already 
metered non-residential buildings “it will not be difficult to charge each individual household” 
by deducting the metered non-residential amount from the total. This point of view quietly 
advocates for a horizontal usage in which householders pay for what they use regardless of the 
value of their property or income. The mayor of the wealthy town of Westmount echoes the 
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Green Economy script maintaining that this method is “a fairer way to charge for water and will 
encourage people to conserve water.”   
     The article observes that the municipalities within the agglomeration that are to save the most 
money are those with high property values and a small population base. What is lost in this 
translation of what is fair is the concept of those towns in the agglomeration of Montreal’s water 
system that are wealthier paying a little more so that those that are poorer pay a little less, in an 
inter-community horizontal equity. Vertical equity is externalized in this new scenario in favor of 
horizontal equity. 
     And, instead of democratic deliberation around the transformation of the water system, 
politics is reduced to the settling of “a long-standing” and “nagging grievance” among mayors of 
the Montreal agglomeration, thanks to which “fairness” is said to be achieved. And yet to make 
the case for fairness, figures are presented comparing this year’s bill with last year’s, which is 
not a fair indication of the new tariffication of 2017 that is likely to translate a full cost recovery 
using the new pricing calculation to include infrastructure debt and rising market values. Both 
the new policy and this article in question both perform a mediation realized for provincial 
services in which tariffication externalizes « une responsabilité collective (impôt) » into « un 
ensemble de charges individuelles (tarifs) » (Hurteau et al 2010, 18). Property value-based 
taxation is externalized by practices translated as fiscal “fairness”: economies and conservation 
via metering and user-pay. 
Network Actors, Micro and Macro, Local and Global 
     This thesis puts the case that through the emergent network for the globalization and 
financialization of Montreal’s water-related procurement, micro-actors become macro-actors, as 
translations and their relations within the network proliferate, as seen in the ubiquitous 
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translations of the horizontal equity script in policy documents and practices and forthcoming 
trade agreements materializing Montreal Water Services as ‘fair’. Notably, the value of 
horizontal equity in local service delivery is the same value translated into trade agreements, 
both past and anticipated. 
     As noted in Chapter Two, Globalized Compulsory Competitive Tendering (GCCT) GCCT 
requires the standardization of procurement rules between many nation states. For this 
harmonization to occur the Canadian government has effectively agreed to (at certain thresholds) 
horizontal equity of access to procurement markets for signatories to CETA and TISA. The 
horizontal equity scripts of “fair and equitable treatment” or “non-discrimination” both translate 
as no concessions permitted on account of local proximity, economic size of a country or a 
country’s labor practices.cix 
     This analysis argues that Montreal’s transparency practices are performing a policing and 
standardizing role for this horizontal equity. Coincidentally, the lid on procurement corruption in 
Montreal was lifted on a water meters’ contract, the largest ever in the City’s history in 2009, the 
same year negotiations for CETA began.cx 
     The pervasive nature of Montreal’s procurement corruption appeared to intuitively pose 
visibility as the problem and transparency as the solution to the old price fixing mechanism that 
had informed local procurement through a largely local market of infrastructure contractors. 
From 2009 this local market had to begin to make way for another much more powerful 
globalized procurement of water-related markets in a globalized procurement network with all its 
relations, practices and scripts. 
     The local corruption in Montreal functioned as part of a procurement assemblage of price-
fixing, from January 1, 2004 until December 31st 2009, in a system that had involved 
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bureaucrats, companies, lawyers, meters, lobbyists, cocktail parties, the mysterious “Mr. X”, 
“Mr. Sidewalk” as well as other unidentified actors (their names redacted from municipal 
documents) and as many as 3 mayors.cxi 
      While the media continue in 2016 to parade an array of colorful actors as artefacts of the 
former system, practices for the new procurement are still being translated into the emergent 
network: metering of non-residential buildings and a new water pricing calculation, a new 
tariffication for 2017, Metropolis status for Montreal, due in 2016, and mediations to realize 
globalized compulsory competitive tendering with the introduction of CETA and TISA.       
       The failure of the previous procurement network to include transnationals equitably is noted 
by the investigating commission reporting the exclusion of foreign corporations from bidding: 
« Stratagèmes à l’étape de l’appel de qualification: Adopter des critères de nature à pénaliser un 
groupe étranger […] Disqualifier la filiale d’une multinationale française sans fournir 
d’explication.»cxii  Here is another glimpse of the transition of power from one network to 
another as, following Callon (1991, 152), the local procurement network depunctualizes or fails 
as its global counterpart punctualizes or gathers strength. 
     The representation of the old ways of procurement now designated ‘corrupt’ (and unfair and 
inequitable by dinto) informs the performance of the new practices that promise to address 
institutional gaps and opaqueness that have allowed local corruption to thrive. The standardizing 
strictures of both global and financial market cultures are now performing: firms seeking any 
supply or service contract at the City worth more than $100,000 have to be vetted by Quebec’s 
financial regulator, and the province’s permanent anti-corruption squad, UPAC (The Gazette 
2014.)cxiii 
     Private eye and forensic accounting firms are presently highly sought after by businesses that 
 115 
want to put their houses in order to gain access to the “good list” of those approved for bidding 
on government tenders; a list that is regulated by the Financial Market Authority (AFM), 
sanctioned by the two-year old Integrity in Public Contracts Act.  An article in the Montreal 
Gazette quotes one chartered accountant as saying, “It’ll be like having an ISO certification” of 
integrity.cxiv  With these new municipal practices the effect of housecleaning for transparency is 
being created, materializing new safeguards and controls in the form of new standards, 
deregulations, regulations, practices, roles, digital technology, functionaries, lawyers, websites 
and so on.   
      Apart from any anti-corruption effects they may perform, these new housecleaning practices 
also serve to further standardize and harmonize the contract tendering procedure in preparation 
for globalized compulsory competitive tendering (GCCT) under CETA and other trade 
agreements. In this regard Metropolis Montreal is performing a houseclean for the ‘true value’ 
and efficiencies that a globalized competition policy espouses, in a translation of transparency as 
a housecleaning operation for Mayor Coderre’s “city of integrity”.cxv 
     As noted in Chapter Two, the problem of wealth concentration within countries, monopolies 
and oligopolies is externalized in this translation (Harvey 2003, 71; Brennan 2012, 4).  As is the 
ongoing and increasing global trend towards wealth inequality between countries and within 
them (Brennan 2012, 27). 
     In Montreal, the concept of fairness as horizontal equity of competition was interpreted and 
performed by the auditor general when in response to further evidence of bid-rigging of water 
meters in 2009, he expressed the view that “In the presence of an openly competitive market this 
kind of situation would at the very least be unlikely.”cxvi In this view, left to their own devices, 
markets regulate for more fair and efficient competition. However, a report commissioned by the 
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Federation of Canadian Municipalities in 2007, Hamel (2007) from le Groupe de Recherche sur 
l’innovation municipal (GRIM), compares the ideal of the market as the site of pure and perfect 
competition that in Neoliberal economics is supposed to produce “the best of all possible 
outcomes for the public” with the reality of it being characterized by “cartel agreements”.   
     Hamel (2007) concludes that, “It is much more difficult than is generally admitted to incite 
true competition between companies, which generally possess technical and financial resources 
considerably greater than those of the municipality launching the invitation to tender” (Hamel 
2007, 106-107).  This view seems to suggest that it would be very difficult for municipalities to 
detect or intervene in such a way as to prevent bidding corporations coming to such 
arrangements outside of the procurement process. 
      Such detection appears further compromised by recent changes to the municipal 
administration: Recently the Coderre administration introduced Bill 73 that allows the Board of 
Directors of a para-municipal (i.e. a Public-Private Partnership or corporatized municipal 
organization external to government ) to invalidate the decision of the Inspector General, 
responsible for overseeing tenders and routing out corruption and collusion in City 
procurement.cxvii Para-municipals are PPPs, and as clarified in Chapter Three, another form of 
outsourcing and private decision-making over public services.  A study from Hebert et al (2013) 
finds that outsourcing in Quebec generally contributes to making government activities less 
transparent given that private organizations do not fall within the law on access to information. 
They conclude that « Plus le gouvernement transfère ses activités à des firmes externes, moins 
l’information sur ces activités est aisément disponible » (50).   
     The ideal of true competition is surely rendered even more remote when Quebec’s second largest 
newspaper, La Presse, is owned by Power Corporation, a large Transnational Holding Company, 
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with many subsidiaries and with significant investments in Suez Environment, the world’s 
second largest water and waste water services TNC. Though Suez has powerful relations with the 
City, it has a low visibility; the name Suez is not mentioned anywhere on the contracts search 
page on the City’s website, although its subsidiary Degremont has received the single largest 
contract ever in the City’s history to build the world’s largest ozonification plant.  
Unsurprisingly, La Presse appears to only ever cast water TNCs in a neutral or positive light and 
has certainly absented resistance to water commodification in its pages.  Conversely, it has 
assiduously covered the City’s scandal that started with a water meters’ contract assigned to a 
local firm.   
      Allen and Pryke (2013) have observed in the UK a reality this thesis argues is emerging here 
in Montreal: that “any political questions over corporate finance [and corporate influence] have 
been progressively displaced by a more conspicuous concern with practical issues of 
sustainability, water security and environmental governance, as well as by the drive to get a 
better deal for the ‘consumer’” (420).  In Chapter Four, I have described how a new water-related 
procurement is being translated by the network in Montreal in such a way as to materialize the 
effect of ‘fairness’ by deploying particular translations of conservation, equity and transparency 
practices in the materialization of a Green Economy and by absenting resistance.     
Conclusion 
     This analysis has traced globalized and financialized relations of water commodification 
performed within a network for water-related procurement, making visible the performance of 
network values as standards, money, commodities and prescriptions informing and shaping 
network devices and mediations.  In so doing, it has revealed underlying logic materializing 
Montreal’s water production and all its infrastructure as sites of accumulation or profit (Huws 
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2011, 65).  Using a material semiotics this ANT analysis has traced and detected the local 
emergence of a network for globalizing and financializing water-related procurement for an 
emergent Water Economy by apprehending not only its practices and their values but also the 
other realities that are performing, known as hinterlands. Tracing the trajectory of the network’s 
powerful values has rendered the possibility of detecting emergent practices of the network here 
in Montreal and of reading their teleology and anticipating the network’s likely course.  This 
may in turn make apparent new lines of resitance. 
      Latour (2004b) writes, “It is when power is exerted through things that don’t sleep and 
associations that don’t break down that it can last longer and expand further – and for this of 
course, links of another social contract are required” (225). This ANT analysis foregrounds 
emergent embedded scripts inside practices that are both performing and valuing water 
differently, supplanting the unwritten social contract of a public water available to everyone with 
that of a financialized contract (indeed many financialized infrastructure contracts) materializing 
and socializing water for those who can pay the market price decided by global markets. This is 
likely not a social contract intended to include local people power and their democratic 
procedures but rather is one being performed by financialized actors such as corporations, 
meters, tariffs, markets, calculations, investors, consumers and their value-laden scripts. As 
Latour appears to suggest, a deeper and more trenchant understanding of democratic practice is 
required in order to apprehend the networked, multiple, heterogenous relations and value-laden 
ontology of human, non-human and non-living agencies materializing reality, in this case at the 
point of Montreal Water Services and the procurement of its infrastructure. 
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